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COUNTY POWERS IN ASSISTED HOUSING




For some seventy years, and through at least as many programs,
governments at the federal, state or local level have contributed to the
cost of housing the poor in New York State. Programs have devel-
oped slowly, and often with much controversy, from the first modest
steps that tried to encourage private investment in low cost housing to
current rent subsidy programs and homeownership initiatives.
The housing assistance provided by these programs is distinct from
other kinds of public assistance not only because of the large capital
investments that are required, but also because the personal relation-
ships associated with one's home - relationships with landlords,
neighbors and other members of the community - are not changed
easily. Selecting sites for low-income housing will have a profound
effect upon the people who will live there as well as upon the neigh-
borhood,' and it is therefore of the utmost importance that those
making site decisions be in the best position to do so.
The selection of sites that will serve the interests of the poor and of
the neighborhoods they will live in demands attention to a multitude
of factors, including education, recreation, health services, transporta-
tion, shopping and police protection, as well as to financing and budg-
etary concerns. Successful developments will reflect the extent to
which planning decisions are made by those who are knowledgeable
about such factors and who are in a position to assure their delivery.
Failed ventures are more likely to be the product of decisionmakers
who are either uninvolved in the community or disengaged from its
political and legal process.
* John P. Dellera is Regional Counsel for the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development in New York. He is a graduate of Michigan State University (B.A.,
1966) and Fordham Law School (J.D. 1969). The views expressed herein are those of the
author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Housing and
Urban Development.
1. For a description of the first halting efforts of middle-income homeowners and
low-income tenants of Yonkers, N.Y. to live with each other after new public housing
units opened under court order, see Melinda Henneberger, A Yonkers Street: Whites,
Blacks and Silence, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1992, at Al.
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This article will show that with the exception of facilities set aside
for people who cannot live independently, the law has historically
given counties in New York State little or no role in addressing hous-
ing issues, with decisions being left to private enterprise, municipali-
ties and public corporations. However, pressures persist to find new
ways to finance assisted housing and to overcome local opposition to
unpopular projects. Proposals are thus regularly advanced to grant
powers to county governments to initiate their own housing pro-
grams. In 1992, the Attorney General of New York State issued an
opinion that departs from previous opinions of his office and invites
greater county involvement in low-cost housing. 2 The opinion report-
edly inspired a proposal from Westchester County to build 5,000 units
of "affordable housing" that would not be subject to local opposition.3
The exclusion of counties from low-income housing programs is a
controversial matter. It is said that county involvement would allow
for regional solutions to regional problems and would be more effec-
tive in dealing with racial and economic segregation.' Others say that
county powers could undermine municipal home rule and lead to the
construction of housing where local opposition makes development
difficult or where it impairs the delivery of support services.5 Support
for these points can be found in racial segregation cases like Yonkers6
and Gautreaux,7which show that members of representative bodies
often exercise a veto power over proposed sites for low-income hous-
ing and are therefore able to exclude low-income projects from their
districts.' Where opposition to a project is based upon economic or
2. 1992 Op. Att'y Gen. I 92-4 (1992) [hereinafter Op. Att'y Gen. 92-4]. For an
extended discussion of this opinion, see infra Part IV.
3. Lisa W. Foderaro, O'Rourke Proposes Low-Income Housing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
25, 1992, at B5; Lynda Richardson, County Executive Details Affordable-Housing Plan,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1992, at 30 ("The program ... appears crafted to head off the
resistance commonly seen among neighborhood groups over proposals for low-income
housing and transitional housing for homeless people.").
4. See TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION,
REPORT No. 9, HOUSING, LABOR & NATURAL RESOURCES, at 28-29 (1967) [hereinafter
TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION] ("[T]he exclusion of counties... complicates reloca-
tion problems and permits the continuation of economic and racially segregated commu-
nities in many parts of the state.").
5. Id.
6. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 624 F. Supp. 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd,
801 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1986).
7. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
8. In Yonkers, the court found that "the operation of the City's ward system pro-
vided strong incentive for individual councilmen to defer to the views of their constitu-
ents on subsidized housing, and for the Council as a whole to defer to the views of the
ward councilman." 624 F. Supp. at 1369. In Gautreaux, the court found that the Chi-
cago Housing Authority followed a practice of "informally clearing each [proposed hous-
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racial factors, the exercise of such veto power may contribute to un-
lawful segregation by increasing the concentration of assisted housing
in low-income areas that present no such opposition.9
It is not clear, however, that regionalizing site selection would ame-
liorate the situation, and it might actually make it worse. Communi-
ties are now required to consider regional housing conditions in
making zoning decisions, 10 and they must also affirmatively further
fair housing if they participate in federal programs that provide grants
for economic development, such as the Community Development
Block Grant Program. II Such requirements encourage low-income
housing development within municipal boundaries and are intended,
as the Court of Appeals has observed, "to avoid the parochialism of
elected local officials in communities which excluded minorities and
socioeconomic groups from undeveloped areas of their municipalities
to cater to a favored constituency." 12 If county governments obtain
the power to build such housing, it is reasonable to expect that more
sites will be chosen in areas of the county having the greatest need and
where land is cheapest, which is to say, in areas with the highest per-
centage of residents who are poor. Since these areas often have the
ing project] site with the Alderman in whose Ward the site is located and eliminating
each site opposed by an Alderman." 296 F. Supp. at 913. See also ELIZABETH WOOD,
NATIONAL CTR. FOR Hous. MANAGEMENT, THE BEAUTIFUL BEGINNINGS, THE FAIL-
URE TO LEARN: FIFTY YEARS OF PUBLIC HOUSING IN AMERICA 12-13 (1982) [hereinaf-
ter WOOD] (stating that one reason Congress provided for local housing authorities in the
U.S. Housing Act of 1937 was "to avoid the possibility that parochial or dishonest local
politicians would interfere with [the public housing program]").
9. In Yonkers, the court stated, "the segregative effect of the actions challenged by
plaintiffs has been remarkably consistent and extreme. It is, to say the least, highly un-
likely that a pattern of subsidized housing which so perfectly preserved the overwhelm-
ingly white character of East and Northwest Yonkers came about for reasons unrelated
to race." 624 F. Supp. at 1369.
10. See Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 341 N.E.2d 236, 242 (N.Y. 1975) ("There
must be a balancing of the local desire to maintain the status quo within the community
and the greater public interest that regional needs be met. Although we are aware of the
traditional view that zoning acts only upon the property lying within the zoning board's
territorial limits, it must be recognized that zoning often has a substantial impact beyond
the boundaries of the municipality."). Where a county planning board is in existence,
municipalities must obtain the board's comments on certain zoning decisions before they
are implemented, but final authority rests with the municipality. See N.Y. GEN. MUN.
LAW § 239-m (McKinney 1986).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 5309 (1988). The community development block grant program was
authorized by Title I of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (1974) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5320 (1988 & Supp. II
1990)). Under the program, the Federal Government provides grants to eligible commu-
nities for economic renewal and increased economic opportunities for low- and moderate-
income persons. For a fuller discussion of the Community Development Block Grant
Program, see infra notes 293-307 and accompanying text.
12. Asian Ams. for Equality v. Koch, 527 N.E.2d 265, 272 (N.Y. 1988).
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largest minority population, the exercise of housing powers at the
county level could increase the degree of racial as well as economic
segregation in the county simply because county officials, taking the
path of least resistance, may avoid selecting sites in communities that
oppose low-income housing and may instead locate projects where
popular support exists.
In addition to these political factors, New York's zoning law might
increase the degree of housing segregation if county officials stepped
in to meet housing needs neglected by municipalities. In the absence
of exclusionary practices that violate the civil rights laws,1 3 the obliga-
tion of municipalities under zoning laws to provide for low-income
housing within their own borders could be satisfied by county pro-
grams, since "a town need not permit a [zoning] use solely for the
sake of the people of the region if regional needs are presently pro-
vided for in an adequate manner. '"14 The net effect of granting coun-
ties the power to initiate housing projects may therefore reduce or
even extinguish a municipality's obligation to zone for low-rent hous-
ing where county projects in other communities meet regional hous-
ing needs. As a result, the concentration of assisted housing in those
other communities would increase.
Regional solutions to common problems or cooperative efforts
among local governments are advocated by planners because they are
sometimes the most efficient ways to provide public services. Con-
structing housing is, however, peculiarly local in nature: site selection
involves zoning and land use laws that are generally administered lo-
cally; construction requires compliance with local building codes; oc-
13. See Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir.),
aff'd, 488 U.S. 15 (1988). The Court of Appeals found that a zoning ordinance restrict-
ing the development of low-income housing to a largely minority urban renewal area had
a discriminatory effect and that a prima facie case of discrimination in violation of Title
VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1988), was thereby estab-
lished. The Supreme Court did not reach the question of whether disparate impact is the
proper test under Title VIII because the parties did not contest the issue. 488 U.S. at 18.
14. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 341 N.E.2d 236, 242 (N.Y. 1975). New York
does not subscribe to the "Mount Laurel" approach, see Suffolk Hous. Serv. v. Town of
Brookhaven, 491 N.Y.S.2d 396, 402 (App. Div. 1985), aff'd, 511 N.E.2d 67 (N.Y. 1987);
Asian Ams. for Equality v. Koch, 514 N.Y.S.2d 939, 950 (App. Div. 1987), aff'd, 527
N.E.2d 265 (N.Y. 1988), which assigns to municipalities responsibility to meet their "fair
share" of regional housing needs. See South Burlington County NAACP v. Mt. Laurel
Twp, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975); South Burlington County NAACP v. Mt. Laurel Twp,
456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983).
In Koch, the Court of Appeals did not reject the Mt. Laurel approach, as the Appel-
late Division had done. Instead, the Court distinguished the case at bar - which in-
volved densely-developed New York City - from Mt. Laurel, which concerned largely
undeveloped suburbs. 527 N.E.2d at 272-73. In a proper case, the door remains open for
a Mt. Laurel claim in New York.
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cupancy must conform with local occupancy standards; and a
successful project requires support of local utilities and municipal
services ranging from sanitation to police protection.15 These func-
tions are usually administered locally and must be coordinated with
project development if projects are to be successful. Making the deci-
sion to build a project in a jurisdiction that opposes it may therefore
create more problems than it solves.
The resistance of Yonkers to the construction of court-ordered pub-
lic housing shows how a housing development may be adversely af-
fected when the municipal government opposes the project.16 The
construction of 200 public housing units was ordered by a federal
court in 1986 and later enforced through the threat of escalating fines
that would have exceeded $1 billion within a month. 7 The district
court's remedial order contained considerable detail about housing
sites, development methods and financial inducements, among other
things," but this "Housing Remedy Order" was only the beginning of
six years of delay and continued opposition to construction that was
mounted by City officials. The court was subsequently called upon to
resolve detailed matters including zoning and title conveyance;1 9 pro-
vision of surveys, soil borings, and technical studies of housing sites;20
15. See John R. Nolon, Shattering the Myth of Municipal Impotence: The Authority of
Local Government to Create Affordable Housing, 17 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 383 (1989).
16. Non-governmental opposition in the local community can delay projects and in-
crease construction costs, but if the opposition lacks merit, if funds are available, and if
the local government supports the project, it will in all likelihood be built. Litigation
involving a 50-unit project in Huntington, N.Y., which has been in the planning stage
since 1984, illustrates the point. See Strathmore Hills Civic Ass'n v. Town of Hunting-
ton, 537 N.Y.S.2d 264 (App. Div.), appeal denied, 547 N.E.2d 103 (N.Y. 1989) (chal-
lenge to public housing site based upon zoning and environmental issues); Grayson v.
Town of Huntington, 545 N.Y.S.2d 633 (Sup. Ct. 1989), aff'd, 554 N.Y.S.2d 269 (App.
Div.), appeal denied, 565 N.E.2d 1269 (N.Y. 1990) (challenge based upon parkland is-
sue). Legislation further restricting the alienation of parkland for public housing pur-
poses was enacted after the second lawsuit was resolved in favor of the project, Act of
Aug. 22, 1990, ch. 929, § 2, 1990 N.Y. Laws 2012, thereby precipitating a third lawsuit,
Grayson v. Town of Huntington, No. 9782/91 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Suffolk Co.). This case
was dismissed in 1992 on the grounds that the 1990 legislation was inapplicable. Id., slip
op. at 3. A fourth lawsuit, Litwin v. Town of Huntington, No. 29380/91 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.,
Suffolk Co.), claimed title to the public housing site by adverse possession. This case, too,
was dismissed in 1992. Id., slip op. at 2.
17. United States v. City of Yonkers, 856 F.2d 444, 459 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'd on other
grounds sub. nom., Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265 (1990). The Court of Appeals
limited the fine to $1 million per day.
18. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 635 F. Supp. 1577 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd,
837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988).
19. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., No. 80 Civ. 6761 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20,
1987).
20. Yonkers, No. 80 Civ. 6761 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 1987).
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site selection, site density, eminent domain proceedings, tax abate-
ments and bonuses to developers;21 and changes in property tax
records, demapping of public streets, and various other title
questions.22
It is clear that the lack of support from local government can frus-
trate housing development in many ways. The orders entered in Yon-
kers involved only some of the complicated steps requiring the
cooperation of local governments, and the extraordinary resistance of
Yonkers 23 was overcome only because of the extraordinary powers
exercised by the federal courts.24 It is obvious that county govern-
ments, unaided by a federal judge acting to remedy civil rights viola-
tions, would not fare as well against municipal opposition. The
success of low-income housing developments will thus depend upon
affirmative support for projects by the municipalities in which they
are located.
This article argues that under New York law, the role of municipal-
ities is central in housing development and that county governments
have few powers to initiate low-income housing programs. These
roles are firmly grounded in a desire to limit public debt and to assure
that subsidized housing is provided by municipal governments since
they are in the best position to assess local housing needs and to pro-
vide such housing with the public services that it needs. Part II
briefly describes the growth of federal and state housing programs.
Part III discusses the constitutional and statutory limits on county
housing powers in New York State. Part IV considers whether
county police powers authorize assisted housing programs. Finally,
Part V discusses the extent to which counties can participate in fed-
eral housing programs.
II. Development of Housing Assistance Programs
Government housing programs were created in the United States
during the early part of this century. Prior to that time, assistance
was offered through "settlement houses" built by wealthy individuals
who would "settle" themselves in poor neighborhoods to assist the
poor, often providing supportive services, such as child care, summer
21. First Remedial Consent Decree in Equity, Yonkers, No. 80 Civ. 6761 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 28, 1988).
22. Yonkers, No. 80 Civ. 6761 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 1990).
23. For a description of the City's efforts to overturn the remedy order, see Spallone v.
United States, 493 U.S. 265, 267-75 (1990).
24. For a discussion of limitations on the district court's powers, see Candace Saari
Kovacic-Fleischer, The Remedial Problems of Spallone v. U.S. and Jenkins v. Missouri, 24
URB. LAW. 621 (1992).
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camps, organized sports, job training and family counseling.2" Gov-
ernment involvement was limited to enforcing health and safety codes
enacted after the Civil War for the purpose of improving conditions in
over-crowded tenements.26
In an effort to increase the supply of low cost housing, early state
laws tried to encourage greater private investment in low-income
housing projects. In New York, for example, tax exemptions were
offered to private "housing companies" that agreed to build housing
for low-income persons,27 and programs were devised to increase
mortgage lending.2" These early programs had little impact, however,
with only ten projects being constructed between 1926 and 1938.29
The federal government started providing assistance during the
1930s, building the first public housing projects under an emergency
measure intended to create construction jobs and to clear slums. 30
The Reconstruction Finance Corporation was the first federal agency
authorized to fund low-rent housing,31 but most early construction
was financed by the Housing Division of the Public Works Adminis-
tration established in 1933.32 These early projects were usually con-
structed without the participation of local governments,33 a situation
which soon changed. 34 After persistent efforts on the part of Senator
Robert Wagner of New York and limited support from the Roosevelt
25. See Howard Husock, Bringing Back the Settlement House, THE PUBLIC INTER-
EST, Fall 1992, at 53.
26. See REVISED RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE
OF NEW YORK, vol. II, at 1563 (1938) [hereinafter REVISED RECORD] (remarks of Gov.
Smith during debate of the 1938 State Constitution).
27. State Housing Law, ch. 823, 1926 N.Y. Laws 1507.
28. See Urban Redevelopment Corporations Law, ch. 892, 1941 N.Y. Laws 2039 (re-
placed by N.Y. PRIV. HOUS. FIN. LAW, Art. 13, § 605 (McKinney 1991)); Redevelop-
ment Companies Law, ch. 845, 1942 N.Y. Laws 1855 (replaced by N.Y. PRIv. HOUS.
FIN. LAW, Art. 13, § 605 (McKinney 1991)).
29. TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 16 n.25; see also New York
City Hous. Auth. v. Muller, 1 N.E.2d 153, 156 (N.Y. 1936) ("After ten years of experi-
ment, [use of limited dividend corporations] for economic reasons, has proved inadequate
as a solution.").
30. See IRVING WELFELD, WHERE WE LIVE 159 (1988) [hereinafter WELFELD].
31. Act of July 21, 1932, ch. 520, 47 Stat. 711 (1932) (repealed by Act of June 30,
1947, ch. 166, title II, §§ 206(a)-(e), 18 U.S.C. § 605 (1988)).
32. Act of Mar. 23, 1933, ch. 5, 48 Stat. 20 (1933) (repealed by Act of June 30, 1947,
ch. 166, title II, §§ 206(a)-(e), 18 U.S.C. § 605(b) (1988)). See WOOD, supra note 8, at 2-3
("Prior to the enactment of the Housing Act of 1937, the PWA built 50 projects in 35
cities containing 21,000 units").
33. See supra note 32.
34. The first public housing project in New York State was dedicated by the New
York City Housing Authority in 1935. See FIFTY-SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT, NEW YORK
CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY 2 (1990).
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Administration,3" the United States Housing Act of 193736 (the "1937
Act") was enacted. The 1937 Act authorized federal loans and subsi-
dies to local housing authorities for costs of construction and opera-
tion of low rent public housing.37
The 1937 Act states a clear policy choice that housing should be
built by local authorities and not the federal government. The Act
provides, in pertinent part, "that there should be local determination
of the need for low-income housing to meet needs not being ade-
quately met by private enterprise" and that, accordingly, the govern-
ment shall not finance public housing projects "unless the governing
body of the locality involved has entered into an agreement with the
public housing agency providing for the local cooperation required...
pursuant to this Act."' 38 "Local cooperation" includes exemption of
projects and public housing authorities from state and local taxes in
place of which authorities make "payments in lieu of taxes" to the
municipality. 39 Local cooperation also includes an agreement by the
"applicable local governing body" to provide residents of the housing
authority's projects with the same public services and facilities "nor-
mally furnished to others in the community." 4 The effect of these
provisions is to provide federal financing for public housing only
where the local government agrees to support the project.
The federal public housing program was supplemented in 1939 by
New York State legislation that gave the state and its cities, towns
and villages authority to loan funds (which had been formed under
legislation enacted five years earlier)41 to local housing authorities for
public housing development,42 and to subsidize their operating ex-
penses. 43 Acting under this authority, a number of state- and city-
financed housing projects were developed throughout the state. In the
1950s, the State's Mitchell-Lama Law" authorized for the first time
35. WELFELD, supra note 30, at 158-61; WOOD, supra note 8, at 8-9.
36. Act of Sept. 1, 1937, ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888 (1937) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1437-1437s (1988 & Supp. 11 1990)).
37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437b, 1437d (1988).
38. Id. § 1437c(e)(2) (emphasis added).
39. Id. § 1437d(d); see also N.Y. PUB. Hous. LAW § 52(3) (McKinney 1989) (ex-
empting authorities and their federally-assisted projects from all local taxes).
40. 24 C.F.R. § 941.201(c) (1992). The "applicable local governing body" would be
any local government, whether county or municipal, that has responsibility for furnishing
public services to the community.
41. Municipal Housing Authorities Law, ch. 4, 1934 N.Y. Laws 13 (repealed by N.Y.
PUB. Hous. LAW § 227 (McKinney 1989)).
42. See N.Y. PUB. Hous. LAW §§ 70, 93 (McKinney 1989).
43. N.Y. PUB. Hous. LAW §§ 73, 94 (McKinney 1989).
44. Limited Profit Housing Companies Law, ch. 407, 1955 N.Y. Laws 1061 (codified
at N.Y. PRIV. Hous. FIN. LAW, Art. 2 (McKinney 1991)). This statute authorizes tax
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the use of public funds for the construction of privately-owned
projects for persons with income above public housing limits but be-
low levels needed to purchase housing at market prices.
Unlike the State programs described above, the federal government
originally limited low-income housing assistance to public housing. 5
However, in 1965, Congress created a program for leased housing
assistance under which public housing agencies received federal funds
to lease accommodations in privately-owned buildings for sublease to
low-income families.4 6 In 1974, this leasing program was replaced by
direct subsidies authorized by Section 8 of the 1937 Act,47 to be paid
to owners of existing, newly constructed or rehabilitated housing (the
"Section 8 Program"). Today, the Section 8 Program accounts for
almost $13 billion in annual outlays. 8
Programs emphasizing homeownership rather than rental housing
appeared in 1985 under New York State legislation that sought to
preserve neighborhoods threatened by blight and lack of private in-
vestment.4 9 The legislation creates an "affordable housing corpora-
tion"5 which is authorized to provide grants to eligible applicants for
the cost of construction, rehabilitation, improvement or acquisition of
exemptions, N.Y. PRIv. Hous. FIN. LAW § 33, and state and municipal loans for project
development, id. §§ 22, 23, in return for which the project owner must agree to rent
regulation, id. § 31, sale restrictions, id. § 36, and government supervision of the project,
id. § 32.
45. The New York State programs cited supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text,
were designed to facilitate the construction of private housing for low-income persons.
Federal programs, on the other hand, assisted the poor through public housing and pro-
vided mortgage insurance to help develop rental housing for middle-income families.
See, e.g., Act of Aug. 2, 1954, ch. 649, § 123, 68 Stat. 599 (1954) (authorizing FHA
mortgage insurance for projects with "moderate rental charges"). In 1961, mortgage
insurance programs were amended to encourage construction of privately-owned housing
for low-income persons. See Housing Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-70, § 101(a), 75 Stat.
149 (1961) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 17151 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990)).
46. Pub. L. No. 89-117, § 103, 79 Stat. 451, 455 (1965) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1422
(1988)). The House Report accompanying this legislation noted that existing federal and
state programs "reach only a very small part of the total number of low- and moderate-
income families." H.R. REP. No. 365, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), reprinted in 1965
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2614, 2619.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f. Under the Section 8 Program, the federal government funds
"housing assistance payments" to landlords that equal the difference between rents that
are comparable to those in the area of the project and the tenant's contribution, which is
limited to a percentage of income.
48. See S. REP. No. 356, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1992).
49. Affordable Home Ownership Development Program, Act of Apr. 17, 1985, ch.
67, § 2, 1985 N.Y. Laws 333 (codified at N.Y. PRIv. Hous. FIN. LAW, Art. 19 (McKin-
ney 1991)).
50. The corporation is a subsidiary of the New York State Housing Finance Agency.
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residences for persons who cannot afford market prices.5" An amend-
ment enacted in 1988 makes it clear that eligible applicants include
cities, towns and villages and that a county may act only as an admin-
istrator of a program undertaken by another applicant or in "any
other capacity as permitted by law." '52 Federal homeownership pro-
grams were authorized by the National Affordable Housing Act of
1990."3 The statute creates three separate plans - known as HOPE
I, II and II154 which use grants rather than loans to pay part of the
cost of housing purchased by low-income homebuyers. The legisla-
tion also authorizes "HOME investment partnerships" with state and
local agencies for the purpose of providing "affordable housing."55
An earlier program encouraged homeownership by lower income
families by offering mortgage interest subsidies to reduce the cost of
housing,56 but grants were not used until 1990. Some federal low-cost
rental programs also fund construction with grants today instead of
loans. 57
51. N.Y. PRIV. Hous. FIN. LAW § 1112 (McKinney 1991). The question of who
cannot afford market prices is discussed infra notes 251-54 and accompanying text.
52. Act of Dec. 9, 1988, ch. 714, 1988 N.Y. Laws 3387.
53. Pub. L. No. 101-625, 104 Stat. 4079 (1990).
54. HOPE I funds the purchase of existing public housing units by low-income per-
sons coupled with the replacement of such units by either new or rehabilitated public
housing, the issuance of Section 8 certificates or vouchers or the provision of comparable
State or local assistance. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437aaa-1437aaa-8 (Supp. 11 1990).
HOPE II funds the purchase and resale to low-income persons of units in multifamily
buildings that are either owned, held, or insured by HUD, or owned or held by the Agri-
culture Department, the Resolution Trust Corporation, or a state or local government.
42 U.S.C. § 12871-12880 (Supp. 11 1990).
HOPE III funds the purchase by nonprofit organizations, cooperative associations and
public agencies of single family properties owned or held by federal, state or local public
entities for resale to first-time homebuyers. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12891-12898 (Supp. 11 1990).
55. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12701-12839 (Supp. 11 1990). "Affordable housing" means housing
rented for the lesser of Section 8 "Fair Market Rents" or 30% of the adjusted income of a
family with income equal to 65% of the area median income. It also includes housing for
first-time homebuyers that does not cost more than 95% of the median area purchase
price. Id. § 12746.
56. See, e.g., National Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 235, 82 Stat. 447 (1968)
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1715z (1988 & Supp. 11 1990)). Section 5(h) of the
1937 Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1437c(h), authorized the sale of public housing units, but few sales
have been made in accordance with that provision.
57. Development loans for the construction of public housing were forgiven by Pub.
L. No. 99-272, § 3004, 100 Stat. 102 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437b(c) (1988)).
Supportive housing for persons with disabilities and elderly housing constructed under
Section 202 of the Housing Act of 1959, 12 U.S.C. § 1701q (1988 & Supp. 11 1990), may
now be funded through capital grants rather than loans. Pub. L. No. 101-625, § 811, 104
Stat. 4324 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 8013 (Supp. 111990)); see also Pub. L. No. 101-
625, § 801, 104 Stat. 4297 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1701q (Supp. 11 1990)). The change in
funding is more apparent than real, however, since development loans were repaid from
federal subsidies to the PHA or the Section 8 landlord.
COUNTY HOUSING POWERS
The National Affordable Housing Act also authorized housing pro-
grams for the "frail elderly," the homeless, and the disabled that offer
"supportive services" suggestive of those provided by the settlement
houses of the past. For example, supportive services for the elderly
include "personal care, case management services, transportation,
meal services, counseling, supervision, and other services essential for
achieving and maintaining independent living."58 Supportive services
for the homeless include "health care, mental health services, sub-
stance and alcohol abuse services, child care services, case manage-
ment services, counseling, supervision, education, job training, and
other services essential for achieving and maintaining independent liv-
ing."59 Services for the disabled must address the individual needs of
the residents," and "the appropriate State or local agency" must cer-
tify that such services are "well designed to serve the special needs of
persons with disabilities."6
The question of whether county governments in New York State
have the power to participate in these low-income housing programs
is complicated. As will be discussed below, the answer will depend on
whether the program is designed for persons able to live indepen-
dently or for those who require supportive services. 62 The power of
government to fund public housing construction or private projects in
order to improve distressed areas may not exist for rent subsidy pro-
grams that allow beneficiaries to choose their own dwellings.6 3 Pro-
grams benefiting low-income families raise different issues from those
directed to moderate- and middle-income families, 64 and programs
that allow for the sale of housing may be undertaken by counties in
conjunction with activities that benefit the public, but not as separate
programs.65
III. State Constitutional Restrictions on County Housing
Programs
The New York Constitution contains a number of provisions con-
cerning the powers of counties to engage in low-income housing activ-
ities. Subpart A below discusses Article 18, which excludes counties
from the units of state and local government that may undertake
58. 42 U.S.C. § 8012(g)(7) (Supp. 11 1990).
59. Id. § 11398(11).
60. Id. § 8013(f)(3)(B).
61. 24 C.F.R. § 890.265(c)(19) (1992).
62. See infra notes 148-77 and accompanying text.
63. See infra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
64. See infra notes 251-54 and accompanying text.
65. See infra notes 109-15, 118-27 and accompanying text.
1993]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
housing assistance programs. It also describes the limitations im-
posed by Article 1 that restrict eminent domain to cases providing a
public benefit and by Article 8 that prohibit public gifts for private
purposes. Subpart B describes the limitations on public debt that are
imposed by Articles 8 and 18 and shows that counties may not use
their general debt authority for low-income housing programs. Fi-
nally, Subpart C discusses programs for low-income persons who can-
not live independently and concludes that counties may participate in
such programs under Article 17 of the Constitution.
A. Article 18 and Other Provisions Affecting Housing
The New York State legislation that provides for the use of public
funds for low rent housing is expressly authorized by Article 18 of the
State Constitution, which was adopted in 1938.66 Article 18, § 1,
provides:
Subject to the provisions of this article, the legislature may provide
in such manner, by such means and upon such terms and condi-
tions as it may prescribe for low rent housing and nursing home
accommodations for persons of low income as defined by law, or
for the clearance, replanning, reconstruction and rehabilitation of
substandard and insanitary areas, or for both such purposes, and
for recreational and other facilities incidental or appurtenant
thereto.
The Article authorizes the legislature to grant power to cities, towns
and villages, but contains no explicit authority for counties. On the
contrary, Article 18, § 2 expressly excludes counties from the defini-
tion of "public corporations" which may be provided with public
funds to build or assist low-income housing.67
66. Article 18 consists of ten sections, six of which are discussed in this article as
follows: § 1, see infra notes 67-74 and accompanying text; § 2, see infra notes 67, 75-77
and accompanying text; § 3, see infra notes 142-47 and accompanying text; § 4, see infra
notes 136-41 and accompanying text; § 8, see infra note 131 and accompanying text;
§ 10, see infra notes 214-227 and accompanying text.
67. N.Y. CONST., art. 18, § 2 (McKinney 1987) provides, in pertinent part:
For and in aid of such purposes, notwithstanding any provision in any other
article of this constitution, but subject to the limitations contained in this arti-
cle, the legislature may ... authorize ... capital or periodic subsidies by the
state to any city, town, village, or public corporation ... ; authorize any city,
town or village.., to make such subsidies to any public corporation...; au-
thorize... loans by the state to any city, town, village or public corporation...;
authorize any city, town or village... to make loans to any public corporation;
authorize any city, town or village.., to guarantee.., indebtedness contracted
by a public corporation; authorize ... loans by the state and ... any city, town
or village to or in aid of corporations regulated by law as to rents, profits, divi-
dends and disposition of their property ... and engaged in providing housing
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Although there are no reported court decisions determining the is-
sue, the omission of counties from § 1 and their exclusion from § 2
has led the New York State Attorney General to conclude that Arti-
cle 18 denies housing powers to county governments. The Attorney
General has reached this conclusion in two opinions.6" The first, is-
sued in 1970,69 concluded that a county government could not create
a public housing agency to carry out the purposes of Article 18; and
the second, issued in 1978,70 concluded that counties could not assist
in the development or operation of low-income housing by entering
into rent subsidy contracts with the United States.7' Neither opinion
offered any rationale beyond noting that counties are omitted from
the entities that may be granted powers under Article 18 and that
they are excluded from the definition of public corporations.
Further support for these conclusions may be found, however, in
the venerable rule of construction that expressions of one thing ex-
clude others.72 For example, in Golden v. Koch, 7 the New York
Court of Appeals held that "where a statute describes the particular
situations in which it is to apply, 'an irrefutable inference must be
drawn that what is omitted or not included was intended to be omit-
ted and excluded.' ,,74 Since Article 18 enumerates the units of local
facilities or nursing home accommodations; authorize any city, town or village
to make loans to the owners of existing multiple dwellings for the rehabilitation
and improvement thereof for occupancy by persons of low income...; grant or
authorize tax exemptions... ; authorize cooperation with and the acceptance of
aid from the United States; grant the power of eminent domain to any city,
town or village, to any public corporation and to any corporation regulated by
law as to rents, profits, dividends and disposition of its property or franchises
and engaged in providing housing facilities. As used in this article, the term
"public corporation" shall mean any corporate governmental agency (except a
county or municipal corporation) organized pursuant to law to accomplish any
or all of the purposes specified in this article.
68. Opinions of the Attorney General are given consideration by the courts of New
York State, but they are not binding and do not determine the law. See American Tel. &
Tel. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 462 N.E.2d 1152, 1157 (N.Y. 1984); City of New York v.
State of New York, 306 N.Y.S.2d 131, 147 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
69. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. 153.
70. 1978 Op. Att'y Gen. 162.
71. See also 4 Op. N.Y. Comp. 339 (1948) (Art. 18 "specifically excludes counties
from participati[on]" in housing).
72. See NEW YORK McKINNEY'S STATUTES § 240 (1971).
73. 404 N.E.2d 1321 (N.Y. 1980).
74. Id. at 1323; see also Application of Combs, 254 N.Y.S.2d 143, 145 (Sup. Ct. 1964)
("a power not expressly conferred will not be implied unless essential to the fulfillment of
the objectives of the statute.").
In Golden, the Court abandoned the rule of construction that had been used in Matter
of Kuhn v. Curran, 61 N.E.2d 513 (N.Y. 1945). Golden, 404 N.E.2d 1321 (N.Y. 1980)
(propositions put to popular vote must be construed in accordance with "the meaning
which the words would convey to an intelligent, careful voter"). The Court applied tradi-
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government that may, be authorized to undertake housing activities,
"an irrefutable inference" must be drawn that counties, omitted from
such local governments, were intended to be excluded from the exer-
cise of housing powers covered by Article 18.
Article 18, § 2 authorizes the 'Legislature to grant specified powers
to the state and local government in aid of providing low rent hous-
ing. Such powers include (1) making capital or periodic subsidies to
public corporations, (2) loaning funds to such corporations, (3) guar-
anteeing the indebtedness of public corporations, (4) loaning funds to
limited dividend and limited profit corporations engaged in providing
housing, (5) making rehabilitation loans to owners of multifamily
low-income housing, (6) granting tax abatements for periods of up to
60 years, (7) authorizing cooperation with and acceptance of aid from
the United States, and (8) granting powers of eminent domain in sup-
port of low-income housing.7 The powers to provide tax exemptions
and to cooperate with the United States are not expressly limited to
any specific units of government, whereas the power of eminent do-
main may be granted only to cities, towns and villages, and the power
to commit public funds may be granted only to the state, cities, towns
and villages. These differences suggest that counties can be author-
ized by the legislature to engage in some activities, such as granting
tax exemptions and entering into agreements with the federal govern-
ment to provide low-income housing. The legislature has exempted
assisted housing from county taxes,76 but it has never empowered
county governments to cooperate with the United States in the hous-
ing field. 7" As a result, it would appear that counties are denied all of
the powers encompassed in Article 18, including the power to cooper-
ate with and accept aid from the United States.
Repeated attempts have been made to amend Article 18 by adding
counties to the list of local governments receiving powers thereunder,
but no such proposals have passed successive legislative sessions as
tionally accepted standards used in the interpretation of statutes in construing provisions
of the New York City Charter. It would seem that such standards should also be used in
construing provisions of the New York Constitution. See Schuyler v. South Mall Con-
structors, 303 N.Y.S.2d 901 (App. Div. 1969) (statutory rules of construction are applica-
ble to constitutional provisions).
75. For the full text of Article 18, § 2, see supra note 67.
76. N.Y. PUB. Hous. LAW § 52(3) (McKinney 1989).
77. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 99-h (McKinney 1986) authorizes counties to cooperate
with the United States in programs that are not inconsistent with any other law, but as
shown infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text, county cooperation with the United




required by the state constitution. 78 A revised constitution submitted
to the voters in 1967 would have empowered county governments to
fund low-income housing, but the entire document was rejected by the
voters.79
Despite Article 18's apparent, limitations on county powers, the
State Comptroller concluded in a 1976 opinion80 that county planning
boards could contract with a public corporation to perform the ad-
ministrative functions that public housing authorities perform in the
Section 8 Program. 1 After the Section 8 Program was established,
municipalities were slow to respond to funding invitations published
by the Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"),
raising the prospect that funds allocated to municipalities in New
York State might go unused. To avoid this, the Urban Development
Corporation ("UDC"), a public corporation organized under state
law,8 2 proposed to apply to HUD for Section 8 funds and then to
enter into contracts with county planning boards to perform adminis-
trative services. Such services would include advertising and outreach
(which would be paid for by the UDC), maintaining waiting lists,
processing applications for Section 8 certificates, inspecting units, ap-
proving leases and recertifying tenant income. The Comptroller's
opinion concluded that such an arrangement would be lawful, relying
upon Section 99-h of the General Municipal Law, 3 which enables
78. N.Y. CONST., art. 19, § 1 (1987). The most recent proposed amendments were
passed by the Legislature in 1989 (S.2933A), but failed to pass in 1991. See N.Y. CONST.,
art. 18 (McKinney Supp. 1993). A number of previous proposals are listed in Op. Att'y
Gen. 92-4, supra note 2, at 1014 n.I.
79. See Final Report of the Health, Housing and Social Services Committee, PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Vol.
XI, Doc. No. 48, at 46-47 [hereinafter Final Report].
80. Op. N.Y. Comp. 76-1037 (1976) (unreported).
81. For a description of the Section 8 program, see supra notes 47- 48 and accompa-
nying text. Under HUD regulations in effect at the time, PHAs administering the Section
8 Program were responsible for publicizing the program, maintaining waiting lists, deter-
mining tenant income and contract rents, inspecting units and approving leases, among
other things. 24 C.F.R. § 882.116 (1977).
82. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW §§ 6251-6286 (McKinney & Supp. 1979).
83. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 99-h (McKinney 1986) provides, in pertinent part:
1. As used in this section the term "municipal corporation" shall mean a
county, city, town, village, school district, or board of cooperative educational
services of this state. ...
2. Any municipal corporation shall have power, either individually or jointly
with one or more other municipal corporations, to apply for, accept and expend
funds made available by the federal government either directly or through the
state, pursuant to the provisions of any federal law, which is not inconsistent
with the statutes or constitution of this state, in order to administer, conduct or
participate with the federal government in programs relating to the general wel-
fare of the inhabitants of such municipal corporation. Any such municipal cor-
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municipal corporations (including counties) to apply for and expend
federal funds made available under federal laws that are not inconsis-
tent with state law.
However, the opinion did not consider whether the county activity
would be inconsistent with any other laws.8 4 As indicated above,8 5
Article 18 does not preclude the legislature from authorizing counties
to cooperate with and accept aid from the United States, and a
county's participation in the Section 8 Program is thus not precluded
by Article 18. It would appear, however, that in the absence of statu-
tory authority, a county's administration of the Section 8 Program
would be inconsistent with the Public Housing Law, and it is there-
fore not authorized by Section 99-h of the General Municipal Law.
Section 37(l)(i) of the Public Housing Law8 6 authorizes public
housing authorities to "act as agent for or enter into contracts and
otherwise cooperate with the federal government in connection with
... any federally-aided program to provide dwelling accommodations
for persons of low income.... ." The definition of public housing "au-
thority," as that term is used in Section 37, expressly excludes coun-
ties. 87 This shows that counties are precluded from the activities
specified in Section 37(l)(i), including acting as agent for or entering
into contracts with the United States (such as contracts for annual
contributions of Section 8 funds) or engaging in other activities to
"otherwise cooperate with the United States" in connection with low-
income housing programs.88 Even though the UDC and not the
county planning boards would enter into tie annual contributions
contracts with HUD, the county boards would "otherwise cooperate"
with the federal government by performing all of the administrative
poration is authorized to appropriate and expend such sums as are required to
administer, conduct or participate in any such programs and may perform any
and all acts necessary to effectuate the purposes of any such programs....
84. Cf Op. N.Y. Comp. 79-388 (1979) (unreported) (concluding that county lacked
the power to participate in hospital reimbursement program under exercise of home rule
powers since, given scope of program and implications of county involvement, there was
no assurance that county functions would be consistent with all general laws).
85. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
86. N.Y. PUB. Hous. LAW § 37(l)(i) (McKinney 1989).
87. Id. § 3(2) ("The term 'authority' means a public corporation which is a corporate
governmental agency (except a county or municipal corporation) organized pursuant to
law to accomplish any or all of the purposes specified in article eighteen of the
constitution .. ")
88. Annual contributions contracts are authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(b). As dis-
cussed previously, accepted rules of statutory construction show that the exclusion of
counties from the units of government enumerated in Article 18 of the New York Consti-
tution was intended to preclude counties from undertaking housing activities that are
specified therein. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
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tasks required by the Section 8 Program. 9 Such activities are incon-
sistent with Section 37(1)(i) of the Public Housing Law because it ex-
cludes counties from engaging in them. Counties are not, therefore,
authorized by Section 99-h of the General Municipal Law to adminis-
ter the Section 8 Program under contract with the UDC.
In short, it would seem that in an effort to obtain federal funds, the
Comptroller stretched the law more than a little and reached an un-
warranted result.90 The opinion presents no convincing argument for
its conclusion and can be considered, at best, weak authority for
county performance of administrative services in the Section 8
Program.
It has been suggested that Article 18 is not needed to authorize
government support of low-income housing because adequate author-
ity is granted elsewhere. 9' While it may be true that other legal au-
thority would support certain housing programs if Article 18 did not
exist, the fact can hardly be ignored that Article 18 does exist and that
it excludes counties from its powers. Under these circumstances, ig-
noring its limitations and its history takes a somewhat cynical view of
self-government that would defy the will of the electorate as expressed
in the repeated rejection of proposals to grant powers to counties.9 2
In the absence of authority granted by Article 18, government dis-
bursements for low-income housing raise a number of state constitu-
tional issues. First, the condemnation of private property for housing
development would raise an issue of whether the taking is for a public
use within the meaning of Article 1 of the State Constitution.93 Sec-
ond, such disbursements could violate constitutional prohibitions on
the gift or loan of public funds for private purposes.94 The extent of
89. See supra notes 81-83 and infra notes 313-19 and accompanying text.
90. The opinion accepted the UDC's argument that the Section 8 Program is compli-
cated enough "without further complicating it by requiring that [the] UDC contract with
cities, towns and villages." Also, according to the opinion, if the UDC's proposal were
rejected, New York State would lose 20% of the Section 8 funds allocated to the state.
These are not, of course, legal arguments.
91. See TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 57 (arguing that there
"have been sufficient court decisions regarding the public purpose, due process and the
inherent police power of the state to provide adequate authority to engage in low-rent
housing and renewal activities."); see also infra Part IV (discussing Op. Att'y Gen. 92-4,
supra note 2).
92. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
93. "Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."
N.Y. CONST., art. 1, § 7.
94. N.Y. CONST., art. 8, § 1 provides:
No county, city, town, village or school district shall give or loan any money or
property to or in aid of any ... private undertaking... nor ... give or loan its
credit to or in aid of any ... private undertaking.
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these restrictions is discussed below.
1. Public Use Limits Under Article 1
Federal government efforts to build public housing as a jobs-crea-
tion measure95 were stymied in 1935 by the Sixth Circuit's ruling in
United States v. Certain Lands in Louisville.96 The court held that the
federal government cannot exercise powers of eminent domain to
clear lands for low-income housing because such housing is not a
"public use" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.97 The gov-
ernment chose not to appeal to the Supreme Court, apparently be-
cause it was decided that local governments should bear primary
responsibility for undertaking housing projects with the federal gov-
ernment acting only as a financing agency. 9s However, while the deci-
sion may remain as an obstacle to federal government activity, its
view of "public use" is not binding on the states.
Although the Fourteenth Amendment does not expressly restrict
eminent domain, state housing laws similar to those passed in New
York in the 1920's and 1930's 99 have been challenged under the public
use requirement of the Fifth Amendment, as incorporated into the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' °0 In Fallbrook
Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 10 decided in 1896, the Supreme Court rec-
ognized such a "substantive due process" obstacle to a state's con-
demnation powers, holding that "the citizen is deprived of his
property without due process of law if it be taken by or under state
It has been held that this provision relates only to state and local funds, not to federal
assistance. Kradjian v. City of Binghamton, 482 N.Y.S.2d 89, 91 (App. Div. 1984).
95. See WELFELD, supra note 30, at 159.
96. 78 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1935).
97. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation").
In United States v. Certain Lands in Louisville, the court reasoned, "[t]he taking of one
citizen's property for the purpose of improving it and selling or leasing it to another, or
for the purpose of reducing unemployment, is not, in our opinion, within the scope of the
powers of the federal government." 78 F.2d at 688; see also infra notes 107 and 112.
98. See R. Skilton, Governmental Policies in Land & Housing, 7 U. PiTT. L. REV. 75,
91 n.77 (1941).
99. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
100. See, e.g., Green v. Frazier, 176 N.W. 11 (N.D.), aff'd, 253 U.S. 233 (1920); Opin-
ion of the Justices, 48 So. 2d 757 (Ala. 1950); Rowe v. Housing Auth. of Little Rock, 249
S.W.2d 551 (Ark. 1952); Zurn v. City of Chicago, 59 N.E.2d 18 (Ill. 1945); Spahn v.
Stewart, 103 S.W.2d 651 (Ky. 1937); In re Slum Clearance, City of Detroit, 50 N.W.2d
340 (Mich. 1951); State v. Rich, 110 N.E.2d 778 (Ohio 1953); Belovsky v. Redevelop-
ment Auth. of Phila., 54 A.2d 277 (Pa. 1947); Opinion to the Governor, 69 A.2d 531 (R.I.
1949); Nashville Hous. Auth. v. City of Nashville, 237 S.W.2d 946 (Tenn. 1951).
101. 164 U.S. 112 (1896).
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authority for any other than a public use ... . 2 However, in Green
v. Frazier,°3 decided in 1920, the Court cleared this obstacle for hous-
ing programs, finding that states can constitutionally authorize the
condemnation of land for sale to individuals where competent state
authorities find that such'use promotes the public welfare, and where
their finding is not "clearly unfounded." 1" Subsequent cases show
that the states have great latitude in this regard. 10 5
The laws of some states take a very broad view of public use, re-
quiring only the slightest public benefit. For example, in New Jersey,
the state legislature may authorize condemnation "when it is per-
ceived that there is a degree of public benefit likely to spring out of the
enterprise."'" On the other hand, Oregon has required a direct bene-
fit to the public before private land may be condemned,10 7 stating a
rationale similar to the one expressed in United States v. Certain
Lands in Louisville.10 8
Article 1 of the New York Constitution contains language, similar
to that used in the Fifth Amendment, that permits the exercise of
eminent domain powers for "public use." 109 In New York City Hous-
ing Authority v. Muller, 1'0 the Court of Appeals took a narrow view of
"public use" and limited condemnation in support of housing projects
102. Id. at 158.
103. 253 U.S. 233, 242 (1920).
104. The Court was forthright, if not informative, in its definition of substantive due
process: "What is meant by due process of law this court has had frequent occasion to
consider, and has always declined to give a precise meaning, preferring to leave its scope
to judicial decisions when cases from time to time arise." 253 U.S. at 238. For criticisms
of this concept of the Due Process Clause, see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct.
2791, 2883 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part); see generally RAOUL BERGER, GOVERN-
MENT BY JUDICIARY (1977).
105. See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (legislation author-
izing condemnation of land and resale to private parties in order to reduce concentration
of land ownership in Hawaii was "rationally related to a conceivable public purpose"
and, hence, constitutional); see also Richardson v. City and County of Honolulu, 759 F.
Supp. 1477 (D. Haw. 1991) (legislation regulating condominium rents found to have a
legitimate public purpose where local governing body found that Hawaii's ground lease-
hold system and high demand for housing had created a social emergency).
106. Simon v. O'Toole, 108 N.J.L. 32, 35, (Sup. Ct. 1931), aff'd, 108 N.J.L. 549 (N.J.
1932).
107. Foellar v. Housing Auth. of Portland, 256 P.2d 752 (Or. 1953) (public use of land
taken in a redevelopment area "demands that the public's use and occupation of the
property must be direct.... If the challenged statute contemplated that the Housing
Authority should do no more than acquire, through the power of eminent domain, the
property which comprises a project area, and then sell it to private parties who could do
with it whatever they chose, the statute, obviously, would be invalid.").
108. 78 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1935). See also supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
109. Compare note 93 (public use provision of New York State Constitution) with note
97 (public use provision of Fifth Amendment to United States Constitution).
110. 1 N.E.2d 153 (N.Y. 1936).
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to cases presenting a "substantial menace to the public health, safety
or general welfare." 1 ' The court made it clear that an "incidental or
colorable" public benefit is inadequate to justify the condemnation of
private property.'12 More recently, in Russin v. Town of Union of
Broome County, 1 3 the Third Department invalidated the condemna-
tion of land that was to be developed as low-income housing for sale
to elderly individuals, because Article 18 authorized only low-rent
housing. The court defined "public use" in a way that encompasses
Article 18 objectives:
In the area of housing, a public use is generally found in and of
itself if (1) the project will eliminate or prevent slums or blighted
areas, even if the property is subsequently developed privately, or
(2) the project will provide low-rent housing." 4
The land that was to be condemned in Russin was not located in a
blighted area. In addition, as noted, the proposed use was not low-
rent housing, but the sale of units to occupants. The court thus found
that condemnation was not authorized by Article 18, and concluded
that there was no recognizable public use."11
In sum, New York has limited condemnation of private land to
cases in which a clear public benefit is provided. While the federal
Constitution would allow the States to take private property where
the State's declaration of public use is not "clearly unfounded,""' 6
New York courts have limited condemnation for housing purposes to
I 11. Id. at 155. The court stated, "the essential purpose of the legislation [State Hous-
ing Law, supra note 27, and Municipal Housing Authorities Law, supra note 41] is not to
benefit [low income persons] or any class; it is to protect and safeguard the entire public
from the menace of the slums." Id. at 156. Delegates to the 1938 constitutional conven-
tion argued for adoption of Article 18 on the grounds that it would help clear slums and
improve the public health. REVISED RECORD, supra note 26, vol. II, at 1532, 1563.
112. 1 N.E.2d at 156. "Nothing is better settled than that the property of one individ-
ual cannot, without his consent, be devoted to the private use of another, even where
there is an incidental or colorable benefit to the public."
113. 521 N.Y.S.2d 160 (App. Div. 1987).
114. Id. at 161 (citations omitted); see also Murray v. LaGuardia, 43 N.Y.S.2d 408
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 42 N.Y.S.2d 612 (App. Div.), aff'd, 52 N.E.2d 884 (N.Y.), cert. denied
321 U.S. 771 (1943) (the provision of low rent housing for persons of low income and the
reconstruction of substandard areas both serve legitimate public purposes).
115. The Fourth Department has taken a broader view of "public use," holding that
the term encompasses "any use which contributes to the health, safety, general welfare,
convenience or prosperity of the community." Byrne v. N.Y. State Office of Parks, Rec-
reation & Historic Preservation, 476 N.Y.S.2d 42, 42 (App. Div. 1984). The case, how-
ever, concerned a recreation facility that would be open to the general public. It is not at
all clear that the courts would take a similar view of private housing accommodations
that are not built in connection with the clearance of slums, to provide low-rent housing
covered by Article 18, or as part of some other project that benefits the public.
116. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
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programs authorized by Article 18 of the New York Constitution.
Accordingly, the requisite "public use" will be found where condem-
nation is needed to clear slums and areas of blight or to assemble sites
for the construction of low rent housing for low-income persons. On
the other hand, condemnation may not be used to support homeown-
ership programs, for example, in the absence of some direct benefit to
the public." 7
2. Public Use Limits Under Article 8
Article 8, § 1118 of the New York Constitution imposes restrictions
upon making a gift or loan of public funds or property for a "private
undertaking," which also raises questions of public use. The term
"private undertaking" is given a very narrow definition, however,
which is not easily reconciled with the definition of "public use"
found in condemnation cases in the housing field.
In an opinion issued in 1987, the New York Attorney General con-
cluded that a county could, consistent with Article 8, donate an un-
used county nursing home to a nonprofit corporation that would
convert the project into rental units for the elderly with funds made
available by the State." 9 In 1988, the Attorney General concluded
that a city could donate real property to a nonprofit corporation that
would build "reasonably priced houses to be marketed to qualified
first-time home buyers whose housing needs are not being met."1 20
The opinion found that the program served a valid public purpose,
"by retaining residents who contribute to the local economy and the
local tax base [and by] creat[ing] jobs, thereby benefitting the local
economy."
The 1987 opinion is consistent with Russin 121 and Muller,22 both
of which limited the definition of "public use" to projects serving the
purposes of Article 18, because the nursing home would be used by
the donee as low rent housing. 23 The gift was also consistent with
Article 8 because the nursing home would be put to public use, not for
a "private undertaking." 24 By contrast, the homeownership program
117. See supra notes 109-15 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 94.
119. 1987 Op. Att'y Gen. 58, discussed infra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
120. 1988 Op. Att'y Gen. I 88-75.
121. Russin v. Town of Union of Broome Co., 521 N.Y.S.2d 160 (App. Div. 1987).
See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
122. New York City Hous. Auth. v. Muller, 1 N.E.2d 153 (N.Y. 1980). See supra
notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
123. Article 18 declares that low-rent housing for low-income persons is a public use.
124. The 1987 opinion did not consider whether the county's participation in the pro-
ject was inconsistent with Article 18 or with the Public Housing Law. The answer to this
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described in the.Attorney General's 1988 opinion seems indistinguish-
able from that which the Russin court declared not to be a public use.
Russin invalidated condemnation orders on the basis of Article I be-
cause taking land for sale to homebuyers was not regarded as a legiti-
mate public use. The Attorney General, however, concluded that the
sale of land to first-time homebuyers served a valid public purpose
and thus did not involve an unlawful gift.
There is no reason why government "takings" of private property
must be judged using the same definition of public use as used for gifts
of public property. Indeed, due process guarantees restrict condem-
nation proceedings," 5 but they have no application to gifts of public
property. On the other hand, Article 8's prohibition against gifts for
private undertakings should not be so narrowly defined as to sanction
virtually any program the government supports. Such a view would
render the prohibition largely superfluous in violation of accepted
standards of construction. 26 If, as the Attorney General said, retain-
ing residents in an area and providing employment opportunities is all
that is required to establish a public use, it would be difficult to con-
ceive of any otherwise lawful circumstances in which the government
could not condemn land or give public property away. Homeowner-
ship programs should therefore be considered private undertakings
for purposes of Article 8 unless direct benefits of some kind are ob-
tainable by the public. Slum clearance would certainly qualify; a pro-
gram focused on eliminating unemployment in distressed areas would
probably qualify; and other objectives - such as combating drug
abuse and crime or ending dependency on welfare - might qualify.' 27
Questions similar to those raised by homeownership plans would
also be presented by rent subsidy programs. It has been said that rent
subsidy programs are not authorized by Article 18, because under
Section 2 of the Article, assistance to owners of private projects is
limited to loans and not subsidies.' 2s The legality of using state or
local funds for such programs may therefore be subject to challenge as
would presumably depend upon the extent to which the county participated in the devel-
opment and execution of the proposal. Cf infra notes 80-90, 313-16 and accompanying
text (discussion of county's performance of Section 8 administrative services).
125. See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
126. NEW YORK McKINNEY'S STATUTES § 231 (1971); see Rocovich v. Consolidated
Edison Co., 583 N.E.2d 932, 935 (N.Y. 1991) ("It is an accepted rule that all parts of a
statute are intended to be given effect and that a statutory construction which renders one
part meaningless should be avoided").
127. Cf Daubner v. Harris, 514 F. Supp. 856, 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (maintaining status
of New York City as a cultural center may justify subsidized housing for artists).
128. See TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 27 n.64; but see infra notes
260-65 and accompanying text. For the full text of Article 18, § 2, see supra note 67.
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unlawful gifts. 1 29 Furthermore, any program that gives tenants the
right to move and transfer their subsidies to a new dwelling 3 0 may be
more difficult to justify than programs under which assistance is tied
to a specific project, since the subsidies would be payable to any land-
lord who agreed to lease acceptable housing rather than being di-
rected toward neighborhoods designated for improvement by public
officials. Benefits of the program would then flow more to the individ-
ual tenant and less to identifiable neighborhoods where the assistance
could be justified as meeting some public need.
In sum, it may be said that programs not authorized by Article 18
may lack the public benefits needed to avoid challenges under Article
8, although the definition of public use for this purpose is not as nar-
row as that found in condemnation cases. County powers to under-
take housing programs would be limited by these rules whereas the
powers of the state, municipal governments and public corporations
would be enlarged to the extent provided in Article 18.'a3
B. Public Debt Limits
Article 8, § 4 of the New York Constitution imposes specific limita-
tions on indebtedness incurred for general governmental purposes by
counties and other units of local government. a2 The limits are 10%
of "average full valuation of taxable real estate" for Nassau County
and New York City' 33 9% for cities with populations of at least
125,000,'13 and 7% for all other counties, cities, towns and villages. 3
Debt for housing purposes is authorized by Article 18, § 4,136 which
129. See 22 Op. N.Y. Comp. 489 (1966) (city cannot pay rent of displaced persons, as
this would be a gift in violation of Art. 8). The use of federal funds is not subject to the
gift and loan provisions of the New York Constitution. See Kradjian v. City of Bingham-
ton, 482 N.Y.S.2d 89, 91 (App. Div. 1984). Participation in the Section 8 Program there-
fore raises no question that it may involve an unlawful private undertaking.
130. See 24 C.F.R. pt. 887, subpt. L (1992), which governs mobility and portability of
housing vouchers. Congress extended portability rights to holders of Section 8 Existing
Certificates in the Housing and Community Development Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-
242, § 145, 101 Stat. 1852 (1987) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(r) (1988 &
Supp. 11 1990)).
131. For example, Article 18, § 8 authorizes "excess condemnation" in proceedings
furthering the purposes of Article 18. This power would not be available in county pro-
grams because counties are excluded from Article 18.
132. N.Y. CONST., art. 18, § 4 provides that indebtedness is deemed to include "liabil-
ity.., on account of any contract for capital or periodic subsidies to be paid subsequent
to the then current year." This would include annual contributions for amortization of
development loans as well as those which fund operating subsidy contracts.
133. N.Y. CONST., art. 8, §§ 4(a), (c).
134. Id. § 4(d).
135. Id. §§ 4(b), (e), (f), (g).
136. N.Y. CONST., art. 18, § 4 provides, in pertinent part:
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imposes special limitations on such debt. First, Article 18, § 4 autho-
rizes cities, towns and villages to contract indebtedness to the extent
of 2% of the "average assessed valuation" of real estate subject to
taxation, rather than of full value, as with general purpose debt.'37
Second, the authority to; incur debt for housing activities under Arti-
cle 18 is in addition to general purpose debt that may be incurred by
cities and larger villages, but it is included within the Article 8 debt
limit for towns and small villages. 38  Thus, borrowing for housing
purposes will not reduce the amount of debt that larger municipalities
may incur for general purposes, but it will have that effect in towns
and small villages.
The framers of Article 18 intended to withhold housing powers
from county governments in order to avoid pyramiding county debt
on that of cities, towns and villages carrying on the same activities.
The comments of delegate F.C. Moore regarding what would become
Article 18 are illustrative:
[S]hould all these subdivisions of government [any political subdi-
vision, instrumentality or agency of the state, any county, city,
town or village or instrumentality thereof] be permitted to go into
the field of housing? We do not believe that the county should
... 13' be permitted to do so.
In the City of New York your counties cannot, of course, incur
any indebtedness. Our upstate county government is an overlying
unit of government. It overlies the cities, the towns and villages
contained in the county. In the City of New York under the pro-
posal, you would have one municipal agency within the city exer-
cising.housing powers. Upstate, if counties were left in, we would
To effectuate any of the purposes of this article, the legislature may authorize
any city, town or village to contract indebtedness to an amount which shall not
exceed two per centum of the average assessed valuation of the real estate of
such city, town or village subject to taxation....
Indebtedness contracted pursuant to this article shall be excluded in ascer-
taining the power of a city or such village [with a population over 5,000] other-
wise to create indebtedness under any other section of this constitution.
137. In 1965, the voters rejected an amendment to Article 18, § 4 *that would have
calculated housing debt on the basis of full value (the term used in Article 8) rather than
assessed value. It has been suggested that this is evidence that the voters misunderstand
housing issues, see TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 18, but it more
likely reflects a hostility to higher taxes and subsidized housing. See Final Report, supra
note 79, at 35 (noting voter rejection of proposals to increase housing debt limits):
138. The more restrictive rule for towns and small villages accommodated upstate op-
position to higher debt because of housing activities. See REVISED RECORD, supra note
26, vol. II, at 1527.




have the cities, the towns and the villages in the county carrying on
housing functions and on top of that we would pyramid the debt
by having the county carrying on the same functions, too.140
It would appear that while a concern with administrative confusion
may have motivated some of the opposition to county powers, a con-
cern with overall cost was foremost to most of the delegates. 41 This
concern is reflected by Article 18, § 3 which severely limits state debt
in support of housing and requires that any increases be approved by
the voters. 142 Clearly, the framers were reluctant to incur public debt
for assisted housing. In a period of fiscal austerity for virtually all
levels of government, it is likely that their concerns are widely shared
today and that attempts to amend Article 18 to include counties
would be resisted purely on economic grounds.
To the extent counties incur debt for the "aid, care and support of
the needy," they may use their general purpose debt limits.143 How-
ever, while it appears from the discussion below that Article 17 of the
New York Constitution authorizes the legislature to provide low-in-
come housing for persons requiring special services,'" it is not clear
that counties have authority under existing legislation to incur indebt-
edness for any housing activities. First, the Local Finance Law 45 es-
tablishes procedures for incurring housing debt for Article 18
purposes that do not apply to counties. There is no clear statutory
authority elsewhere that would permit counties to incur debt for
housing purposes. Second, by requiring that housing debt of towns
and small villages be counted against their general debt limits, the
framers of Article 18 intended to restrict housing-related debt.' 46 It
would frustrate their statutory scheme if debt for housing purposes
could be incurred to the limit of general debt authority.
47
140. REVISED RECORD, supra note 26, vol. II, at 1526.
141. For example, Governor Alfred E. Smith and Congressman Hamilton Fish, among
others, warned that New York City real estate was overtaxed and that further taxes
would be counterproductive. Id. at 1568, 1577.
142. The provision limits aggregate annual subsidies to $34 million. N.Y. CONST., art
18, § 3.
143. N.Y. CONST., art. 8,§ 1, .2.
144. See infra notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
145. Section 150.00 of the New York Local Finance Law provides that the 2% limit
applies to activities effectuating the purposes of Article 18 that are undertaken by cities,
towns and villages. N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW § 150.00 (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1992); see
also id. § I 1.00(a)(4 1). It is not clear that county housing activities are authorized by any
other provisions of the statute. See infra notes 201-03 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
147. Cf Diehl v. O'Dwyer, 84 N.Y.S.2d 109, 113 (Sup. Ct. 1948). In Diehl, the court
stated that it was for New York City to decide whether debt incurred for a "facilit[y]...
incidental or appurtenant to a project," see N.Y. CONST., art. 18, § 1, could be financed
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In sum, counties lack authority to incur indebtedness for assisted
housing activities authorized by Article 18. They may use their gen-
eral debt limits under Article 8 to fund programs for the aid, care and
support of the needy, but the legislature has provided no clear debt
authority for county housing programs.
C. Aid, Care and Support of the Needy
Article 17, § 1 of the New York Constitution requires that the state
and its subdivisions provide assistance to the needy "in such manner
and by such means, as the legislature may from time to time deter-
mine."' 48 Counties are subdivisions of the state,14 9 and may therefore
be required to provide assistance under Article 17. It has been held
that Article 17 creates an entitlement to public assistance for those
defined as needy, although the legislature retains discretion to classify
recipients of aid and to define the term "needy."15 It has also been
held that where access to aid programs is contingent upon subjective
factors, applicants for assistance do not have a constitutional right to
benefits, and the government is therefore not required to provide ben-
efits to all who might be eligible.'
The Appellate Division suggested in McCain v. Koch, 52 a suit
brought on behalf of homeless persons to force New York City to
improve conditions in its homeless shelters, that Article 17 requires
the state and its subdivisions to provide emergency housing to eligible
families. The Court of Appeals, however, declined to reach that ques-
tion on appeal because the issues in the case were resolved on other
grounds.' 53 The state of the law thus remains uncertain. In McCain,
within its general debt limit or within the 2% housing debt limit. The court would there-
fore allow projects authorized by Article 18 to be funded under general purpose debt
limits.
148. N.Y. CONST., art. 17, § 1 provides: "The aid, care and support of the needy are
public concerns and shall be provided by the state and by such of its subdivisions, and in
such manner and by such means, as the legislature may from time to time determine."
149. Subdivisions of the State include all political jurisdictions within the state, includ-
ing counties, municipalities and any number of public districts. See 1 EUGENE MCQUIL-
LIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 1.38 (3rd ed. 1987). Under the New York
Constitution, the legislature may provide for the creation of local governments, including
counties. N.Y. CONST., art. 9, § 2(a).
150. See Tucker v. Toia, 371 N.E.2d 449, 452 (N.Y. 1977).
151. See Morillo v. City of New York, 582 N.Y.S.2d 387, 391 (App. Div. 1992) (squat-
ters in city-owned housing have no right to housing under a city program that places
homeless persons in in rem properties because of the broad discretion the City retained in
selecting program beneficiaries).
152. 484 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1984), modified, 502 N.Y.S.2d 720 (App. Div. 1986),
rev'd on other grounds, 511 N.E.2d 62 (N.Y. 1987).
153. McCain, 511 N.E.2d at 65 n.4.
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homeless persons with children contended, among other things, that
the state and its subdivisions were obligated to provide them with ade-
quate emergency shelter under the mandate of Article 17.154 The trial
court recognized no such mandate, but found that once the govern-
ment undertakes to provide shelter, it-must meet reasonable minimum
standards as determined by the court."I The Appellate Division re-
versed,156 suggesting that Article 17 obligates government to provide
emergency shelter, but holding that the adequacy of such shelter is a
matter committed to legislative discretion.' " The court of Appeals
reversed, holding that the courts have power to impose habitability
standards for shelter made available by the government. The court
expressly declined, however, to decide whether the government has a
constitutional obligation to furnish shelter to those in need.'58
The conclusion that the state and its subdivisions are obligated to
house persons who are "needy" could be based upon specific enact-
ments by the legislature, but it is difficult to see how Article 17 itself
creates such an obligation. If it did, virtually all low-income housing
programs would become entitlements, governments would be re-
quired to finance prohibitive costs through current revenue since bor-
rowing would still be limited by Article 8,159 and Article 18 would
become largely superfluous. Such results argue strongly against the
conclusion that Article 17 alone creates an obligation to provide hous-
ing for persons in need. Rather, Article 17 should be interpreted as
authority for the legislature to enact general laws under which the
state and local governments (including counties) may be required to
provide public assistance to the needy. This could include housing
programs that are consistent with Article 18 if the legislature so deter-
mines or it may be limited to cash payments.160
Legislation enacted pursuant to Article 17 provides authority for
county housing programs that may be distinguished from low-rent
154. See supra note 148.
155. 484 N.Y.S.2d at 987.
156. The court's decision was based on Bernstein v. Toia, 373 N.E.2d 238 (N.Y. 1977),
which held that Article 17 does not mandate that public assistance must be granted on an
individual basis in every instance or that the state "must always meet in full measure all
the legitimate needs of each recipient." Id. at 244.
157. 502 N.Y.S.2d at 728, 731.
158. 511 N.E.2d at 65 n.4.
159. See supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
160. The legislative history of Article 17 that is quoted in Tucker v. Toia, 371 N.E.2d
449 (N.Y. 1977), refers to the state's obligation to provide "relief of the needy" and states
that the legislature may "continue the system of relief now in operation.... preserve the
present plan of reimbursement to the localities" or devise "new ways of dealing with the
problem." Id. at 452.
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housing of the kind authorized by Article 18. Such legislation has
thus far drawn a clear distinction between Article 18 programs and
special needs programs authorized by Article 17 that are supervised
by the Department of Social Services. For example, under Section
193 of the Social Services Law,' 6' county welfare districts may estab-
lish and operate "public homes" or "adult care facilities," which are
defined as residences for low-income persons who cannot live inde-
pendently.162 Statutes implementing Article 18,163 by contrast, create
programs for all low-income persons. In addition, statutory defini-
tions of "residence for adults"' and "adult home," 161 which refer to
county facilities authorized by Article 17, expressly exclude housing
projects assisted under the Private Housing Finance Law or the Pub-
lic Housing Law unless such projects operate "distinct programs...
which provide supervision and/or personal care" approved by the De-
partment of Social Services.
The Legislature has thus limited Article 17 to programs for persons
who cannot live independently and has used its authority under Arti-
cle 18 to provide low-rent housing for the general population of low-
income persons. Even though counties cannot undertake Article 18
programs, it would seem that the legislature can give them full au-
thority to participate in programs authorized by Article 17.
The growth of federal special needs programs in recent years has
created increased opportunities for county activity in Article 17-type
housing programs. For example, the federal program of "supportive
housing for the disabled," which was established by the National Af-
fordable Housing Act of 1990,166 funds housing that could fall within
the scope of Article 17 since the program benefits individuals who
cannot live independently and requires that state social service agen-
cies approve the supportive services. Participation in recent programs
for the frail elderly and the homeless might also be authorized by
161. N.Y. SoC. SERV. LAW § 193 (McKinney 1983).
162. Id. §§ 2(21), 193 (McKinney 1983); 10 Op. N.Y. Comp. 55 (1954). Section 193
authorizes county welfare districts to establish a "public home," defined as an "adult care
facility." An "adult care facility" is "a family type home for adults, a shelter for adults, a
residence for adults or an adult home, which provides temporary or long-term residential
care and services to adults who, though not requiring continual medical or nursing care
... are by reason of physical or other limitations associated with age, physical or mental
disabilities or other factors, unable or substantially unable to live independently." N.Y.
Soc. SERV. LAW § 2(21) (McKinney 1983).
163. N.Y. PUB. Hous. LAW (McKinney 1989); N.Y. PRIV. Hous. FIN. LAW (McKin-
ney 1991).
164. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 2(24) (McKinney 1983).
165. Id. § 2(25).




legislation enacted pursuant to Article 17.167 Under Section 131-v of
the Social Services Law, 168 county social services officials are author-
ized to contract with private organizations to provide temporary
emergency shelter for the homeless to the extent this is consistent
with federal law. 169
County participation in federal programs is subject to federal pro-
gram requirements that in some cases - such as supportive housing
for persons with disabilities - limit funding to private, nonprofit or-
ganizations. 70  State enabling legislation could, however, authorize
county governments to assist such programs with their own funds. In
addition, HUD is authorized by the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless
Assistance Act 17 1 to make grants to units of general local government
(including counties) to meet the emergency, transitional and perma-
nent housing needs of the homeless and to help the poor avoid becom-
ing homeless. Federal programs in which counties may be eligible
participants, either directly or in cooperation with the state or other
units of local government, include the Emergency Shelter Grants Pro-
gram, 72 Transitional Housing, 73 Permanent Housing for Handi-
capped Homeless Persons, 174  and Supplemental Assistance for
Facilities to Assist the Homeless. 75 To the extent facilities funded
under such programs meet the definition of "public home" under Sec-
tion 193 of the Social Services Law 176 or are provided under contracts
entered into pursuant to Section 131-v of the Social Services Law, 177
167. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
168. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 131-v (McKinney Supp. 1992).
169. See infra notes 170-77 and accompanying text.
170. 42 U.S.C. § 8013(b) (Supp. 11 1990).
171. Pub. L. No. 101-625, § 821(a), 104 Stat. 4334 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 11363 (Supp. 11 1990)).
172. 24 C.F.R. pt. 576 (1992). Program funds may be used to rehabilitate or convert
buildings for use as emergency shelters for the homeless. 24 C.F.R. § 576.21.
173. 24 C.F.R. pt. 577 (1992). Program funds may be used to construct, acquire or
rehabilitate structures to be used as transitional housing for disabled homeless people or
homeless families with children. The purpose of the housing is to facilitate the relocation
of the residents to independent living accommodations within 24 months. 24 C.F.R.
§ 577.100.
174. 24 C.F.R. pt. 578 (1992). States may apply under this program for funds to con-
struct, acquire or rehabilitate group homes for handicapped homeless persons in need of
supportive services. 24 C.F.R. § 578.5.
175. 24 C.F.R. pt. 579 (1992). Funds are provided for facilities and services (including
temporary housing) that help move the homeless population to permanent housing where
they can live independently. 24 C.F.R. § 579.215(b)(2)(i).
176. See supra note 162.
177. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 131-v (McKinney Supp. 1992). See supra notes 168-69
and accompanying text.
1993]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
they could be provided by county welfare districts in accordance with
their Article 17 powers.
In sum, counties have authority to provide various kinds of housing
assistance to the needy under statutes implementing Article 17 of the
New York Constitution. These statutes, however, limit assistance to
persons who are unable to live independently and who require sup-
portive services provided by county social services agencies.
IV. County Police Powers in Assisted Housing Programs
Courts have long recognized that powers of government to protect
the health, safety and welfare of the public support the construction
of low-income housing in conjunction with the eradication of slums.
For example, in New York City Housing Authority v. Muller,178 the
New York Court of Appeals found that condemnation in support of
public housing projects constructed before Article 18 was adopted
was justified as an effort to "cure or check" slum conditions. 179 In
Murray v. LaGuardia, 80 construction of the privately owned Stuyve-
sant Town project in New York City was found to be authorized by
municipal powers to beautify and reconstruct the City that are "akin
to the police power."181
The adoption of Article 18 accomplished two main objectives: first,
it removed any doubt about the public purpose of low-income housing
activities that were authorized by Article 18; 182 and second, it codified
the extent and nature of government's power to provide low-income
housing." 3 Article 18's codification of housing powers is substan-
tially the same as the recognized definition of police powers in the
housing field.' 8 4 Viewed this way, it may be argued that Article 18
178. 1 N.E.2d 153 (N.Y. 1936).
179. Id. at 155 ("The Session Laws for nearly seventy years past are sprinkled with
acts applying the taxing power and the police power in attempts to cure or check [the
menace of the slums]"). The court upheld a statute giving cities the power of eminent
domain to assist in eradicating slums, calling this "the last of the trinity of sovereign
powers." Id. at 154.
180. 43 N.Y.S.2d 408 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 42 N.Y.S.2d 612 (App. Div.), aff'd, 52 N.E.2d
884 (N.Y. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 771 (1944).
181. 43 N.Y.S.2d at 411.
182. See Op. Att'y Gen. 92-4, supra note 2, at 1014.
183. See REVISED RECORD, supra note 26, vol. II, at 1528-29 (remarks of delegate
F.C. Moore at the 1938 Constitutional Convention) ("We believe that in placing in the
Constitution housing powers for the agencies and subdivisions of the State government,
we are ... invading a new field. We feel, however desirable it may be to go into that
uncharted territory, we should take along with us as our compass the lesson learned from
our fiscal experience of the past, and that such restrictions should be incorporated in the
proposal as our experience has determined wise.").
184. See 7A EUGENE MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 24.563 (3rd ed.
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limits housing police powers to the units of government and activities
contained therein, and that since counties are excluded from those
activities, they are, in effect, denied police powers in the housing field.
This view was taken by a number of housing officials who testified in
favor of a revised constitution proposed in 1967 that would have ex-
panded the scope of Article 18.15
A. The Attorney General's View of County Police Powers
The New York State Attorney General has taken a markedly differ-
ent view. In an opinion issued in 1992, the Attorney General re-
sponded to a request from three New York counties that he state
"whether and the extent to which a county may develop affordable
housing."1 16 The request was supported by arguments from private
lawyers and legal academics that Article 17 provides authority for
county participation in affordable housing programs. 8 7 The Attorney
General did not address those arguments on the merits, however, be-
cause he concluded'that adequate authority for county housing pro-
grams existed in Article 9.V88
The 1992 opinion traces the history of Article 18, finding that
[t]he unambiguous intent of the framers ... was to grant to the
Legislature a limited power to enable certain specified political sub-
divisions to engage in the clearance of slums and creation and
maintenance of public housing. The exclusion of counties from
this group of subdivisions was deliberate.8 9
The Article was needed, the Attorney General said, to declare that
affordable housing is a valid public purpose and to give the legislature
authority to provide for affordable housing programs. 19° Power to
conduct such activity did not otherwise exist for most local govern-
ments, he continued, because with the exception of cities, local gov-
ernments had no significant home rule powers when Article 18 was
adopted. 191
The Attorney General concluded that Article 18 should be seen as
1989) ("Slum clearance, the elimination of unsafe and dilapidated tenements, rehabilita-
tion of blighted areas, housing projects for persons of low income, low-rent housing dis-
tricts and the like are within the general police power to provide for the public health,
safety and welfare.").
185. See infra notes 266-69 and accompanying text.
186. See Op. Att'y Gen. 92-4, supra note 2, at 1010.
187. Id. at 1011.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1013.
190. Id. at 1014.
191. Id.
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a grant of powers to the particular units of government included
therein, not as a limitation on housing powers granted elsewhere.' 92
This conclusion is based upon Article 18, § 10, which is construed as
a preservation of housing powers existing under other provisions of
law.' 93 The authority for counties to engage in low-income housing
was then found in home rule powers that were given to counties and
municipalities under Article 9 of the Constitution as amended in
1963.194
The rest of the opinion discusses the extent of Article 9 police pow-
ers, noting that they must not be inconsistent with the general laws of
the State or exercised in a field that the State has preempted.'9" The
Attorney General does not discuss either limitation in detail and says
only that programs undertaken under Article 9 must be "separate and
distinct from the specific scheme for provision of low-income hous-
ing" that is created by Article 18.196 A list of "affordable housing
activities" is offered as examples of what counties may do, 97 but the
opinion does not define "affordable housing" or otherwise identify the
kinds of programs in which such activities may be pursued.
Finally, the Attorney General opined that, notwithstanding the 2%
limit on housing debt that applies to cities, towns and villages under
192. Id. at 1015.
193. N.Y. CoNsT., art. 18, § 10 provides:
The legislature is empowered to make all laws which it shall deem necessary
and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers. This article shall
be construed as extending powers which otherwise might be limited by other
articles of this constitution and shall not be construed as imposing additional
limitations; but nothing in this article contained shall be deemed to authorize or
empower the state, or any city, town, village or public corporation, to engage in
any private business or enterprise other than the building and operation of low
rent dwelling houses for persons of low income as defined by law, or the loaning
of money to owners of existing multiple dwellings as herein provided.
194. See Op. Att'y Gen. 92-4, supra note 2, at 1015. N.Y. CONST., art. 9, § 2(c)(ii)(10)
empowers local governments to enact legislation relating to "[t]he government, protec-
tion, order, conduct, safety, health and well-being of persons or property therein."
195. Op. Att'y Gen. 92-4, supra note 2, at 1015 n.l.
196. Id. at 1017.
197. Id. at 1016-17. The list includes:
county provision or acquisition of necessary land; the siting of affordable hous-
ing by county government in appropriate locations within the county; county
construction of affordable housing; cooperation by the county with other mu-
nicipalities in the joint provision of affordable housing utilizing the constitu-
tional and statutory grant of authority for municipal cooperation; the
appropriation of county funds for these purposes; and the financing of the costs
of the affordable housing program consistent with general constitutional debt
limitations.
Id. (citations and footnotes omitted).
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legislation implementing Article 18,198 counties may fund affordable
housing to the full extent of their general debt limits.199 This is con-
sistent with Article 18, he says, because it "prevent[s] the spiraling of
debt," as the framers intended. 20°
Legislation governing the issuance of public debt prohibits counties
and other municipal jurisdictions from issuing bonds for a period
longer than the specified "period of probable usefulness" ("PPG") of
the asset to be funded.20 1 The statute specifies PPGs for housing
projects that are constructed in accordance with the Private Housing
Finance Law and the Public Housing Law, both of which implement
Article 18.202 The Attorney General acknowledged that the Public
Housing Law excludes counties from housing activities, but con-
cluded that other subdivisions of the Local Finance Law "may pro-
vide" PPGs for county housing programs.20 3 No such provisions are
identified, however, and none appear from an examination of the
statute.
In sum, the Attorney General found that counties had the power to
undertake low-income housing activities under their general police
powers and that they could fund such activities by incurring indebted-
ness to the extent of their general debt limits. The only limitation he
recognized was that county powers may not involve the "specific
scheme" of Article 18, which he did not attempt to define. Legisla-
tion that governs the issuance of public debt for housing purposes
appears to be inapplicable to counties, and the Attorney General
failed to show that there is a statutory basis allowing counties to incur
such debt. This opinion represents a sharp departure from prior opin-
ions of the Attorney General and the State Comptroller, 201 and while
its description of the history of Article 18 is unassailable, its applica-
tion of that history and its analysis of the statutory scheme are subject
to several criticisms, as the following discussion shows.
198. N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW § 150.00 (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1992); see supra notes
132-38 and accompanying text.
199. Op. Att'y Gen. 92-4, supra note 2, at 1018.
200. Id.
201. N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW § 11.00 (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1992).
202. Id. § 11.00(a)(41). N.Y. PRIV. Hous. FIN. LAW § 2(20) (McKinney 1991) and
N.Y. PuB. Hous. LAW § 3(13) (McKinney 1989) define projects undertaken thereunder
as those which "effectuate the purposes of article eighteen."
203. Op. Att'y Gen. 92-4, supra note 2, at 1018.
204. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 80-90 and ac-
companying text (discussing Op. N.Y. Comp. 76-1037 (1976) (unreported)).
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1. The Attorney General's Opinion is Inconsistent With Rules of
Statutory Construction
In the first place, the argument that Article 18 does not prohibit
counties from undertaking housing programs is, as discussed above,205
inconsistent with "traditionally accepted standards of statutory con-
struction. ' ' 2°6 These standards dictate that the exclusion of counties
from Article 18 should be interpreted as a prohibition against county
participation. The Attorney General's view that the 1963 revisions to
Article 9 which granted police powers to counties, towns and villages
superceded the exclusion of county powers in Article 18 contravenes
the rule disfavoring the implied repeal of statutes. 20 7 The view would
also render the inclusion of cities in Article 18 superfluous since cities
already had full home rule powers when Article 18 was adopted in
1938.208 If police powers had been sufficient to undertake housing
programs, there would have been little point to granting housing pow-
ers to cities in Article 18.1o If, in fact, police powers conferred au-
thority to undertake low-income housing projects, most of Article 18
would have become extraneous upon the adoption of the 1963 revi-
sions to Article 9. The Attorney General's view that Article 9 em-
powers counties to participate in low-income housing programs
therefore contravenes the rule that statutory interpretations should be
avoided if they would render portions of the statute meaningless.210
The Attorney General did not discuss any of these principles of statu-
tory construction.
205. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
206. See Golden v. Koch, 404 N.E.2d 1321, 1323 (N.Y. 1980).
207. See NEW YORK McKINNEY'S STATUTES § 396 (1971).
208. N.Y. CONST., art. 9, in effect on January 1, 1939 provided, in pertinent part:
§ 4. . . . The Legislature shall, by general laws, confer upon the boards of super-
visors, or other governing elective bodies, of the several counties of the state
such further powers of local legislation and administration as the legislature
may, from time to time, deem expedient....
§ 12 ... Every city shall also have the power to adopt and amend local laws
not inconsistent with this constitution and laws of the state ... in respect to the
following subjects: ...the government and regulation of the conduct of its
inhabitants and the protection of their property, safety and health.
209. One reason for including cities in Article 18 would be to increase their borrowing
capacity for housing programs. See N.Y. CONST., art. 18, § 4. This would not explain
the inclusion of cities in Article 18, § 2, however.
210. NEW YORK McKINNEY'S STATUTES § 231, (1971); see Rocovich v. Consolidated
Edison Co., 583 N.E.2d 932, 935 (N.Y. 1991) ("It is an accepted rule that all parts of a
statute are intended to be given effect and that a statutory construction which renders one
part meaningless should be avoided").
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2. The Attorney General's Opinion is Inconsistent With Debt
Limitations
If the Attorney General's view of Article 18 were correct, the con-
stitutional scheme of debt limitations imposed upon local govern-
ments would be irrational. As discussed above,2 ' debt limits for
general governmental purposes range from 7-10% of the full value of
real estate within the taxing jurisdiction, but debt for Article 18 hous-
ing purposes is limited to 2% of assessed value. This 2% may be
incurred in addition to the general limits of cities and large villages,
but it counts against the general debt limits of towns and small
villages.212
By finding general police powers adequate to undertake low-income
housing activities, the Attorney General reaches the anomalous result
that since counties are not granted powers under Article 18 to incur
housing debt, they are not subject to the limitations Article 18 im-
poses on such debt. Counties could then use their full general debt
limits for housing activities (7-10% of full property value), while cit-
ies, towns and villages would be limited to 2% of assessed value.213 In
other words, the only unit of local government that was not granted
powers by Article 18 would end up having greater spending powers
than the others.
3. The Attorney General's Opinion is Inconsistent With Article 18
§ 10
As discussed above,214 the Attorney General regarded Article 18,
§ 1021 5 as preserving county powers that are granted elsewhere in the
Constitution and as requiring that Article 18 not be construed as im-
posing "additional limitations" on county powers. The pertinent lan-
guage provides:
[t]his article shall be construed as extending powers which might
otherwise be limited by other articles of this constitution and shall
not be construed as imposing additional limitations....
The Attorney General's view is an artful construction of a section
others have called "probably unnecessary, ' 21 6 but it fails the test of
logic and is contrary to the view of the framers. .
211. See supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 137-38 and 146-47 and accompanying text.
213. See Op. Att'y Gen. 92-4, supra note 2, at 1018.
214. See supra notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
215. For the full text of Article 18, § 10, see supra note 193.
216. See TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 45 ("It is argued that the
entire section is probably unnecessary, as it merely reaffirms the authority in Section L.").
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First, as the Attorney General observes, counties did not acquire
home rule powers until Article 9 was amended in 1963.217 The intent
of § 10 was therefore unrelated to county police powers since none
existed in 1938 when § 10 was adopted. Furthermore, the logical ex-
tension of the Attorney General's argument is that since counties
have police powers under Article 9 which authorize housing pro-
grams, and since Article 18 may not be construed as limiting those
powers, the exclusion of counties from Article 18 means nothing.218
This argument is refuted by the standards of statutory construction
discussed above.219 It also contradicts the Attorney General's own
theory that counties are excluded from the "specific scheme" of Arti-
cle 18.220 If Article 18 imposes no "additional limitations" on county
housing powers, then counties should not be excluded from any of the
activities authorized by Article 18.
Second, the Attorney General's construction of § 10 ignores the
second half of the provision, which reads as follows:
but nothing in this article contained shall be deemed to authorize
or empower the state, or any city, town, village or public corpora-
tion, to engage in any private business or enterprise other than the
building and operation of low rent dwelling houses. 221
The quoted language expressly limits participation in private enter-
prise by the state and units of local government that may be granted
housing powers under Article 18. It thus prohibits them from engag-
ing in business activity under Article 18 other than the construction
and operation of housing.222 It would frustrate this statutory scheme
if counties, having been granted no powers under Article 18, were
Section 1 is the declaration of Article 18's purposes. See supra notes 66-67 and accompa-
nying text.
217. Op. Att'y Gen. 92-4, supra note 2, at 1015.
218. The Attorney General argues that denying counties the 2% housing debt author-
ity that is contained in Article 18 prevents the "spiraling of debt." See supra note 200
and accompanying text. This assumes, of course, that counties would have been treated
like cities and large villages whose 2% may exceed their general debt limit. If, however,
counties had been treated in Article 18 like towns or small villages, denying them the 2%
housing debt would have had no effect upon aggregate debt because the 2% would count
against the general debt limit. See supra notes 137-38 and 146-47 and accompanying
text.
219. See supra notes 72-74, 205-10 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 195-97 and accompanying text.
221. The Attorney General's opinion substitutes a period for the semi-colon used in
the second sentence of § 10 and fails to indicate that the remaining language, which is
quoted in the text, has been omitted. Op. Att'y Gen. 92-4, supra note 2, at 1015.
222. The exclusion of government from such other activities follows from the tradi-
tional standards of statutory construction discussed supra at notes 72-74 and accompany-
ing text.
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given powers to engage in private enterprise that are denied all other
units of government. In addition, when § 10 is read with Article 18,
§ 1,223 it appears that the reference in § 10 to "additional limitations"
should be construed only as preserving the powers of local govern-
ments under § 1 to provide parks and other facilities that are located
next to low-income housing projects. The framers of Article 18 in-
tended to assure that publicly-funded recreational facilities provided
in connection with housing projects would be open to the public.
Without § 10, it was thought that Article 18 could be interpreted as
authorizing public funding of private parks and recreational facilities
because Article 18, § 1 authorizes the legislature to provide for facili-
ties "incidental or appurtenant" to housing projects that would not be
open to the general public. To avoid this interpretation, the framers
inserted the language quoted above that the Attorney General over-
looked, thus making clear that construction and operation of low-rent
housing is the only private business activity in which the government
may engage.224 The provision that Article 18 creates no "additional
limitations" on government powers makes it clear that local govern-
ments retain their traditional powers to provide public parks and fa-
cilities appurtenant to housing projects.225
In sum, § 10, as interpreted by the Attorney General, makes the
exclusion of counties from Article 18 virtually meaningless and dis-
torts the statutory scheme of the New York State Constitution insofar
as it limits government participation in private business activity. On
223. See supra note 66-67 and accompanying text.
224. See TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 44-45 (the second part of
§ 10 quoted in the text "simply defines the intent [of Art. 18] a little more at length.").
225. See REVISED RECORD, supra note 26, vol. III, at 1714 (remarks of delegate
O'Shea):
The purpose of this amendment [adding the second part of § 10 that is quoted
in the text] is to make sure that the intention as expressed by Mr. Baldwin when
we were considering Section 1 of the bill [later adopted as Art. 18, § 1] shall
prevail. Section 1 of the bill gives permission for the public corporation or for
the city or state to provide for recreational and community facilities incidental
or appurtenant to the improvement. And this amendment is designed to make
sure that under that authorization in Section 1, the public corporation or the
State or the city shall not have power to engage in any private enterprise or
business other than the building of houses or the loaning of money. ...
It is not intended by this amendment ... to prevent the municipality or the
State from providing parks or playgrounds or facilities that would be considered
public and not private.
See also TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 44, expressing the following
view of the portion of § 10 quoted by the Attorney General: "In this form its intent and
effect were to insure, as far as possible, the liberal construction of the previous provisions
of Article 18." It obviously did not occur to the Commission that the section could be
interpreted as the Attorney General proposes.
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the other hand, § 10 can be given a construction that is consistent
with the statutory scheme and with the intention of the framers. Ac-
cordingly, the requirement that Article 18 shall be construed as "ex-
tending powers which otherwise might be limited" should be seen as
overriding limitations on housing activity imposed by the gift and
loan clause 226 or the public use requirement.227 The provision that
Article 18 shall not be seen as "imposing additional limitations"
should be seen only as a preservation of municipal powers to provide
public parks and other facilities in connection with housing projects.
4. The Attorney General's Opinion is Inconsistent With Other
Provisions of Law
The most serious deficiency in the opinion is, however, its failure to
explain the relationship between Articles 9 and 18 and the statutory
scheme of laws enacted under both constitutional provisions. Under
Article 9, § 2(c)(ii)(10), local governments, including counties, are
granted authority to adopt local laws "not inconsistent with the provi-
sions of this constitution or any general law" relating to "[t]he gov-
ernment, protection, order, conduct, safety, health and well-being of
persons or property therein. ' 228 Home rule legislation and laws au-
thorizing cooperation with the United States contain similar general
welfare language as well as similar requirements that laws not be in-
consistent with constitutional or statutory provisions. 229 The princi-
ple expressed in these provisions is that police powers exist only if
they are "not inconsistent" with other provisions of law, but that
where inconsistencies exist, such other provisions will control. 230 It
226. N.Y. CONST., art. 8, § 1. See supra note 94.
227. N.Y. CONST., art. 1, § 7. See supra note 93.
228. N.Y. CONST., art. 9, § 2(c)(ii)(10).
229. See N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(l)(ii)(a) (McKinney 1969) (empowering
counties to enact local laws in specific areas "not inconsistent with the provisions of the
constitution or . . . any general law"); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 99-h(3) (McKinney
1986) (authorizing local government cooperation with the United States in programs re-
lating to the general welfare which are undertaken pursuant to federal law "not inconsis-
tent with the statutes or constitution of this state").
230. See Town of Clifton Park v. C.P. Enterprises, 356 N.Y.S.2d 122, 124 (App. Div.
1974) (prohibition against "inconsistent" laws "is a check against local laws which would
contradict or would be incompatible or inharmonious with the general laws of the
State"); see also People v. Cook, 312 N.E.2d 452, 457 (N.Y. 1974) (New York City law
requiring retailers to charge a higher price for cigarettes having a high tar and nicotine
content was not inconsistent with state laws where the state had taken no position with
respect to price regulation); cf Village of Nyack v. Daytop Village, 583 N.E.2d 928, 931
(N.Y. 1991) (state regulation of site selection for substance abuse treatment facilities not
inconsistent with local zoning laws because "[s]tate and local regulation of the placement




therefore appears that counties have no police powers under Article 9
where they have been denied housing powers under Article 18 or
under the general laws of the state. The Attorney General hinted at
this conclusion by finding that police powers are adequate to support
only those activities that are "separate and distinct" from the "specific
scheme for provision of low-income housing" under Article 18.231
Rather than define what he meant by the "specific scheme," the
Attorney General identified a number of "affordable housing" activi-
ties that counties could undertake under their police powers.2 32 These
include: provision or acquisition of land;233 selection of sites for af-
fordable housing "in appropriate locations within the county;" con-
struction of affordable housing; cooperation with other units of local
government in housing programs; appropriation of county funds for
these purposes; and financing of program costs within general debt
limits. There is little question that counties could exercise powers like
these in programs authorized by legislation enacted under Article
17.234 Legislation could also conceivably authorize counties to exer-
cise such powers in housing programs that are "separate and distinct"
from the purposes of Article 18.235 However, because counties are
excluded from Article 18,236 there is no question that they cannot ex-
ercise powers to effectuate the purposes of Article 18.
An understanding of what counties can do in the housing field
therefore requires that one define the scope of Article 18. As shown
in Subpart B below, Article 18 has been broadly defined to authorize
virtually all low rent housing programs for persons of lower income.
There are some exceptions, such as homeownership programs and re-
habilitation of single family homes,237 and housing authorized by Ar-
ticle 17,238 but most housing commonly known as low-income
housing is authorized by Article 18. Participation by counties in such
231. Op. Att'y Gen. 92-4, supra note 2, at 1017.
232. See supra note 197. The opinion does not define the terms "affordable" or "low-
income" and uses them interchangeably.
233. The opinion assumes that the county's powers of eminent domain may be used to
assemble sites for low-income housing. Op. Att'y Gen. 92-4, supra note 2, at 1016. For
the reasons explained supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text, it would appear that
they may not.
234. See supra notes 161-77 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 66-77 and accompanying text.
237. See infra notes 255-59 and 269-70 and accompanying text.
238. For a discussion of Article 17 housing, see supra notes 148-77 and accompanying
text. Article 18, § 1 expressly authorizes "nursing home accommodations," which might
otherwise be considered housing for persons who are unable to live independently, which
is authorized by Article 17. Existing legislation does not grant authority to counties in
this area, however, and provides for the development of nursing homes with assistance
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low-income housing programs would be inconsistent with Article 18,
and it is therefore not authorized by county police powers.239
B. The "Specific Scheme" of Article 18
The purposes of Article 18 are to authorize low rent housing and
nursing home accommodations for persons of low income, to elimi-
nate slums, and to provide recreational and other facilities in connec-
tion with the foregoing. 2 ° The framers thought of Article 18 as a
"health measure" rather than a welfare program, 24' although clear-
ance of slums and blight is not a prerequisite to building low rent
housing.24 2 Any programs that provide low rent housing for low-in-
come persons are therefore within the statutory scheme of Article 18.
The legislature has provided for extensive low-rent housing activi-
ties in laws enacted pursuant to Article 18. For example, under the
Public Housing Law, public housing "authorities" - which expressly
excludes counties 243 - have the following powers: identifying areas
of substandard housing;2 " condemning land;245 clearing such areas;24 6
constructing low-income housing projects; 247 contracting with the
federal government "in connection with any federally-aided program
to provide" low-income housing;24 and leasing and subleasing dwell-
ings to low-income persons.249 These powers are substantially the
same as the "affordable housing activities" that the Attorney General
said counties could undertake;250 but since authority to engage in
provided by the State Housing Finance Agency. See N.Y. PRIV. Hous. FIN. LAW
§ 41(6) (McKinney 1991).
239. See supra notes 229-31 and accompanying text.
240. See N.Y. CONST., art. 18, § 1.
241. REVISED RECORD, supra note 26, vol. II, at 1532.
242. See Murray v. LaGuardia, 43 NY.S.2d 408, 410 (Sup. Ct. 1943) ("The object and
purpose of [Article 181 was not limited to low rent housing for persons of low income but
also in the disjunctive for reconstruction and rehabilitation of substandard areas."); see
also N.Y. PRIV. Hous. FIN. LAW (McKinney 1991). Under the Private Housing Finance
Law, low-income housing projects constructed under this statute may involve slum clear-
ance, id. § 2(20), or they may be limited to the provision of low rent housing, id. § 12(4).
The purpose of projects assisted under the New York Public Housing Law may be for
slum clearance "or providing homes for persons of low income." N.Y. PUB. Hous. LAW
§ 3(13) (McKinney 1989).
243. See N.Y. PUB. Hous. LAW § 3(2) (McKinney 1989).
244. Id. § 37(1)(b).
245. Id. § 37(1)(m).
246. Id. § 37(1)(g).
247. Id. § 37(l)(e).
248. N.Y. PUB. Hous. LAW § 37(l)(i) (McKinney 1989).
249. Id. §§ 37(1)(k), (m).
250. Op. Att'y Gen. 92-4, supra note 2, at 1016-17; see supra notes 197, 232-34 and
accompanying text.
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them is given to housing authorities and since counties are excluded
from the definition of authorities, county participation would be in-
consistent with the Public Housing Law.
Courts have given a broad scope to Article 18. Accordingly, it has
been taken as authority not only for housing commonly known as
public housing, but also for programs such as the Mitchell-Lama Law
which benefit lower income persons who cannot afford market
prices. 251 Beneficiaries of such "lower income" programs are defined
as:
Persons or families who are in the low income groups and who
cannot afford to pay enough to cause private enterprise in their
municipality to build a sufficient supply of adequate, safe and sani-
tary dwellings.252
This definition raises more questions than it answers and creates
considerable uncertainly as to the limits of Article 18. "Low income
groups" could arguably include anyone with an income below the me-
dian, and costs in excess of amounts one can afford could arguably be
determined under mortgage banking standards, but fixing an objective
price at which "private enterprise" is willing to build housing is prob-
ably impossible. Since most developers will not build any residential
projects without government inducements (such as tax credits, deduc-
tions, abatements, zoning variances or the like), unaided "private en-
terprise" would probably not build much housing. The statute must
therefore refer to businesses that require inducements to build low-
income housing that exceed those available to residential housing
projects generally. Any such analysis would require many subjective
judgments and could not be performed with precision.
The scope of Article 18 (and, hence, the limits of Article 9)253
therefore depends upon how the vague definition of low income per-
251. Minkin v. New York City, 198 N.Y.S.2d 744, 749 (Sup. Ct.), appeal dismissed,
202 N.Y.S.2d 992 (App. Div. 1960) (Condemnation held consistent with Article 18 where
action was taken in support of Mitchell-Lama project: "[It] makes no difference whether
the income of those sought to be aided is in the lowest income group or above that group,
so long as the income is not sufficient to produce that rental which will attract private
industry to build housing"); Chelcy v. Buffalo Mun. Hous. Auth., 206 N.Y.S.2d 158, 168
(Sup. Ct. 1960) (Conversion of low rent public housing project to Mitchell-Lama cooper-
ative for families of "middle income" was not unconstitutional "as long as the income [of
tenants] is not sufficient to produce the rental which attracts private industry to build
housing.").
252. N.Y. PUB. Hous. LAW § 3(18) (McKinney 1989); N.Y. PRIv. Hous. FIN. LAW
§ 12(10) (McKinney 1991). The New York definition of "persons of low income" was
originally used in the U.S. Housing Act of 1937, but federal law has used percentages of
area income since 1974. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(b)(2).
253. See supra notes 228-39 and accompanying text.
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sons will be applied to the facts in particular cases. The more broadly
Article 18 is defined, the less likely it is that county housing programs
will be constitutional. Under the circumstances, it may not be possi-
ble to say with any assurance whether a particular "affordable" hous-
ing program is outside the scope of Article 18 and within the scope of
county police powers. Counties that establish their own programs in
the belief that the activity is authorized by Article 9 police powers
may therefore place themselves as well as their bond counsel254 in an
untenable position if the law subsequently defines "low-income hous-
ing" for Article 18 purposes in a way that covers the county's pro-
gram. Such a definition would limit the county's police powers,
thereby invalidating the perceived legal basis for the program. The
scope of Article 18 is also unclear with respect to other housing activi-
ties, such as homeownership plans and rent subsidy programs.
County activities in these areas could therefore be challenged as un-
constitutional where it may be said that the activity has been reserved
to other units of government by Article 18.
1. Homeownership Programs
One of the strongest cases to be made for the proposition that coun-
ties are authorized to undertake housing programs is in the area of
homeownership programs.2 5 As the court decided in Russin v. Town
of Union of Broome County,256 a plan for the sale of housing to low-
income individuals is not authorized by Article 18 because the consti-
tution authorizes only low-rent housing. Counties are thus not ex-
cluded from developing low-income homeownership programs by
Article 18, and they may be authorized to engage in such activities by
Article 9 police powers. However, police powers, powers of eminent
domain and the power to make gifts or loans of public funds are lim-
ited in varying degrees to programs that have a valid public use.257 It
is questionable whether homeownership programs would fall within
such powers unless the program also provides some significant benefit
to the public.2 51
254. If the county issues bonds to fund housing programs, lawyers considering the
bond issue's legal requirements could find it difficult to say that the bonds were validly
issued if it is unclear whether the housing was authorized by county powers.
255. For a description of such programs, see supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
256. 521 N.Y.S.2d 160 (App. Div. 1987). See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying
text.
257. See supra notes 95-131 and accompanying text; see also 6A EUGENE McQUILLIN,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 24.05 (3d ed. 1988) (stating that the exercise of police
powers is proper only where the general welfare is served rather than purely private
interests).
258. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
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Programs that may be supported by county police powers include
homesteading plans like the Federal Nehemiah Program,259 which
could help redevelop blighted areas by constructing or renovating
homes for low- to middle-income homebuyers. Neighborhood rede-
velopment would be a valid public purpose justifying the exercise of
police powers, and counties would not be excluded from the activity
because the sale of housing is clearly not authorized by Article 18,
and the exercise of police powers would therefore not be inconsistent
with Article 18.
2. Rent Subsidy Programs
While it has been said that Article 18 does not authorize rent sub-
sidy programs because Article 18, § 2260 authorizes only loans and not
subsidies to owners of private projects,261 § 2 does allow cities, towns
and villages to pay periodic subsidies to public corporations.262 Arti-
cle 18 thus arguably authorizes an arrangement, like the Section 8
Program, 263 under which housing authorities receive subsidy pay-
ments from the state or cities, towns or villages and then pay rent
subsidies to private landlords. Since Article 18 does not authorize
counties to fund public corporations, their participation in such a pro-
gram would be inconsistent with Article 18 and therefore would be
excluded from county police powers.
The Federal Section 8 Program is authorized by Article 18, § 2,
under which the Legislature may empower counties to cooperate with
the United States. Such cooperation in low-rent housing programs is
restricted by the Public Housing Law, however, to public housing
"authorities. ' ' 264  County participation in the Section 8 Program
would thus be inconsistent with the Public Housing Law and would
259. "Nehemiah Housing Opportunity Grants," named for the Biblical prophet who
rebuilt Jerusalem, see H.R. REP. No. 122, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 95 (1987), reprinted in
1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3317, 3411, were authorized by Title VI of the Housing and Commu-
nity Development Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-242, 101 Stat. 1951 (1988) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 17151 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990)). The legislation was designed to
encourage homeownership by lower income families, to rebuild depressed urban areas,
and to increase employment opportunities in low-income areas by providing loans to mid-
dle-income families for the purchase of one- to four-family dwellings in distressed areas.
260. For the full text of Article 18, § 2, see supra note 67.
261. See TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 27 'n.64.
262. N.Y. CONST., art. 18, § 2 provides that the Legislature may "authorize any city,
town or village ... to make [periodic] subsidies to any public corporation." But see 22
Op. N.Y. Comp. 489 (1966) (city cannot pay rent of displaced persons, as this would be a
gift in violation of Article 8).
263. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
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therefore be excluded from Article 9 police powers. 265
3. Other Housing Programs
It was argued during the debate on the proposed 1967 constitution
that counties could not provide senior citizen housing266 because Arti-
cle 18 authorized such programs and excluded counties. This is un-
questionably true in the case of programs for low-income persons, but
it is conceivable that counties could undertake assisted rental pro-
grams for higher income senior citizens under their police powers.
Such programs would be excluded from the scope of Article 18 if they
do not benefit "lower income" persons2 67 and could therefore be au-
thorized by county police powers if they provide a public benefit. 268
The point was also made in the 1967 debate that New York City
could not provide mortgage interest subsidies or rehabilitation loans
to the owners of one- and two-family homes because such activities
are not authorized by Article 18.269 Even though Article 18 does not
authorize these activities, it does not follow that police powers neces-
sarily would. Since police powers may not be exercised in a manner
that is inconsistent with the constitution or general laws, they do not
authorize activities that Article 18 prohibits, either expressly or by
implication. By providing authority for rehabilitation loans for multi-
ple dwellings, Article 18 impliedly prohibits such loans for other
kinds of dwellings.27 ° Thus, even though single family rehabilitation
loan programs would be outside the scope of Article 18, they would
not be authorized by county police powers since authority to conduct
such programs was denied by Article 18.
In summary, county police powers do not authorize activity that is
"inconsistent" with Article 18 or the general laws of New York,
265. Id. See also supra notes 228-39 and accompanying text.
266. See Final Report, supra note 79, at 34 (statement of then Nassau County Execu-
tive [now U.S. District Judge] Eugene Nickerson).
267. See supra notes 251-54 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 95-131 and accompanying text; but see N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW
§ 290 (McKinney 1986) (county property may not be used for elderly housing). County
property may be sold to nonprofit organizations for use as elderly housing, however. See
supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
269. Jason R. Nathan, New York City's Housing and Development Administrator,
said that mortgage interest subsidy programs and measures to rehabilitate single family
homes were hampered because of the restricted scope of Article .8. Final Report, supra
note 79 at 34. Article 18, § 2 authorizes legislation giving cities, towns and villages the
power "to make loans to the owners of existing multiple dwellings for the rehabilitation
and improvement thereof for occupancy by persons of low income." N.Y. CONST., art.
18, § 2 (emphasis added).




meaning that which would be "incompatible or inharmonious" with
such laws.271 Counties therefore lack the power to provide low rent
housing for low-income persons, either as public housing272 or as pri-
vate subsidized housing constructed with public funds.273 For the
same reason, counties may not undertake programs for the rehabilita-
tion of single family dwellings because that would be incompatible
with Article 18's exclusion of such activity.274 It would appear that
counties are precluded from participating in federally-assisted rent
subsidy programs because those programs are apparently authorized
by the Public Housing Law, 275 but it is less clear whether non-feder-
ally-assisted rent subsidy programs are within the scope of Article 18.
On the other hand, state legislation enacted pursuant to Article 17
could authorize counties to participate in programs for low-income
persons who are unable to live independently.276 The state legislature
could also enable counties, using their police powers, to engage in
homeownership programs or affordable housing programs for higher
income persons that provide a public benefit.277
V. County Participation In Federal Housing Programs
Most of the federally-assisted housing programs discussed in Part
11278 are administered through public housing agencies that receive
funds for development and operation of public housing or for pay-
ment to private landlords as rent subsidies. Other programs, includ-
ing homeless programs 279 and some homeownership plans, 280 provide
funds to states and units of local government. Subpart A below shows
that counties in New York State lack authority to act as public hous-
ing agencies and therefore cannot participate in most federal housing
programs. Subpart B concludes that larger counties that qualify as
"urban counties" participate in housing programs through coopera-
tion agreements with municipalities, even though counties lack the
271. See Town of Clifton Park v. C.P. Enterprises, 356 N.Y.S.2d 122, 124 (App. Div.
1974); see supra notes 228-30 and accompanying text.
272. See N.Y. CONST., art. 18, § 2 (excludes counties from making loans or paying
subsidies to public corporations (public housing authorities) for the provision of low-rent
housing); see also N.Y. PuB. Hous. LAW § 37(l)(e) (McKinney 1989).
273. See N.Y. CONST., art. 18, § 2 (excludes counties from making loans to limited
profit corporations for the provision of low-income housing).
274. N.Y. CONST., art. 18, § 2, quoted supra note 67.
275. N.Y. PuB. Hous. LAW § 37(l)(i) (McKinney 1989).
276. See supra notes 161-69 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 255-59 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 36-40, 47-48 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 58-61, 171-75 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
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power to participate in most low-income housing programs. Subpart
C summarizes the discussion elsewhere in this article dealing with
special needs programs and homeownership.
A. Counties Acting As Public Housing Agencies
Programs created by the U.S. Housing Act of 1937281 authorize the
Secretary of HUD to enter into contracts with public housing agen-
cies either to fund public housing development costs and operating
expenses282 or to make rent subsidy payments to private landlords.283
The term "public housing agency" ("PHA") is defined as
any State, county, municipality, or other governmental entity or
public body (or agency or instrumentality thereof) which is author-
ized to engage in or assist in the development or operation of lower-
income housing.2"4
Whether a PHA is "authorized to engage in" or "assist" in the devel-
opment or operation of low-income housing is determined under state
law.
As seen in Part III, Article 18 of the New York Constitution pre-
cludes counties from making loans or subsidies for low-income hous-
ing, 18 and the Public Housing Law excludes counties from
cooperating with and accepting aid from the United States in low-
income housing programs.286 County participation in either public
housing programs or in privately-owned assisted housing would
therefore be inconsistent with the general laws of the state and would
thus fall outside the scope of county police powers.28 7 Given this state
of the law, it would appear that counties are not authorized to engage
in or assist in the development or operation of low-income housing,
and they are therefore precluded from acting as PHAs.288
281. Act of Sept. 1, 1937, ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888 (1937)(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1437-1437s (1988 & Supp. 11 1990)).
282. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437b, 1437d.
283. Id. § 1437f.
284. Id. § 1437a(b)(6) (emphasis added). New York law uses the term public housing
"authority" to identify public corporations that are organized to provide public housing.
N.Y. PUB. Hous. LAW § 3(2) (McKinney 1989).
285. See supra notes 66-79 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 228-39 and accompanying text.
288. Subpart B draws a distinction in the Block Grant Program between "undertak-
ing" assisted housing activities and "assisting" other governments in their own activities
under home rule legislation. See infra notes 308-27 and accompanying text. No such
distinction is appropriate in determining whether counties may act as PHAs, however,
because the term "assist" as used in the 1937 Act refers to privately-owned housing that
PHAs support through the payment of rent subsidies. As stated in the text, counties are
precluded from acting in this area by the Public Housing Law.
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Even though the legislature could enable county governments to
act as PHAs or to otherwise participate in federal assisted housing
programs, such an extension of powers would likely have only limited
effect. First, legislation alone cannot grant powers of eminent domain
to counties for the purpose of providing low-rent housing, because
counties are excluded from such powers by Article 18, § 2 of the New
York Constitution .2 9 Thus, even with enabling legislation providing
authority to participate in federal housing programs, counties would
be limited to purchasing land for low-income housing projects unless
municipal governments or public corporations were willing to exer-
cise their own powers of eminent domain.29 Second, many of the
objectives to be attained by extending powers to counties, such as in-
creasing efficiency in the provision of public services and providing
regional solutions to regional problems,29' can be attained through the
exercise of powers of townships in New York State. Under existing
law, townships.have full authority to organize public housing authori-
ties that may operate within villages wishing to avoid the expense of
creating their own authorities.292
B. Actions Under Cooperation Agreements
In 1974, Congress enacted Title I of the Housing and Community
Development Act of 1974 (the "1974 Act"), 293 under which HUD
provides "community development block grants" to states and local
governments for economic development activities. The primary ob-
jective of the program is "development of viable urban communities,
by providing decent housing and a suitable living environment and
expanding economic opportunities, principally for persons of low and
moderate income. ' 294 Grants paid to cities with at least 50,000 peo-
ple and to "urban counties" are entitlements that are calculated by a
statutory formula,295 while other communities must compete for dis-
289. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
290. Public housing authorities organized under New York law have powers of emi-
nent domain, N.Y. PUB. Hous. LAW § 120 (McKinney 1989), that would not be avail-
able to counties without an amendment to Article 18.
291. See supra notes 4-15 and accompanying text.
292. N.Y. PUB. Hous. LAW § 30 (McKinney 1989). Township authorities may oper-
ate within villages if the town and village governing bodies consent. Id. § 31.
293. Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (1974) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5320 (1988
& Supp. 11 1990)). The purpose of the 1974 Act is described supra note 11.
294. 42 U.S.C. § 5301(c) (1988).
295. Id. § 5306(b). The purpose of providing entitlement grants to "urban counties" is
to encourage "urban-suburban cooperation on housing and renewal." See S. REP. No.
693, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4273, 4320.
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cretionary grants.296 A county's status as an "urban county" thus
assures that it will receive community development block grants each
year the program is funded. Block grants fund a substantial part of a
county's economic development efforts, with Westchester County, for
example, receiving approximately $60 million since the program's
inception.297
The Block Grant Program funds a wide range of community devel-
opment activities other than housing. 29 Block grant funds may not
generally be used to construct housing, but they can support housing
development by assembling and clearing sites, providing site improve-
ments and paying for certain planning and financing costs. 299 The
following discussion concludes that while counties in New York have
only limited powers to undertake or assist in undertaking low-income
housing activities, they have nevertheless qualified as "urban coun-
ties" and are thus able to use federal funds for limited housing
purposes.
1. Qualification as Urban County
A county may qualify as an "urban county" if it has a population of
at least 200,000 persons with at least 100,000 residing in unincorpo-
rated areas3°° or in cities, towns and villages that enter into coopera-
tion agreements with the county.30 1 The parties to such agreements
296. See 42 U.S.C. § 5306(d).
297. See Statement in Support of Act No. 124-1992 of the Westchester Co. Board of
Legislators Submitted by the Committee on Community Affairs and Housing (Sept. 24,
1992).
298. For example, eligible activities include: provision of homeless shelters, convales-
cent homes, halfway houses and group homes for the mentally retarded, 24 C.F.R.
§ 570.201(c) (1992); provision of employment services, fair housing counseling, welfare
services or recreation, id. § 570.201(e); repair of streets and public buildings in distressed
areas, id. § 570.201(0; payment of relocation assistance to persons and businesses who
are displaced by federally-assisted activities, id. § 570.201(i); removal of architectural
barriers to public and private buildings, id. § 570.201(k); provision of distribution lines
and facilities of privately owned utilities. Id. § 570.201(1).
299. 24 C.F.R. § 570.207(b)(3) (1992). Housing development grants provided under
§ 17 of the 1937 Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1437o(d), were terminated as of October 1, 1989. Pub.
L. No. 100-242, § 152, 101 Stat. 1855 (1988).
300. The term "unincorporated areas," as used in the 1974 Act, means areas "which
are not units of general local government." 42 U.S.C. § 5302(a)(6)(A). In New York,
general local governments include cities, towns and villages, which have powers to govern
their local affairs under N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10 (McKinney 1969 & Supp.
1992). In the area of publicly-assisted housing, "municipalities," which includes cities,
towns and villages, N.Y. Pun. Hous. LAW § 3(5), have the power to organize public
housing authorities, id. § 30(1), and to construct projects themselves. Id. § 55. The term
"unincorporated areas" therefore means any part of a county which is not within the
jurisdiction of a city, township or village.
301. 42 U.S.C. § 5302(a)(6)(A)(ii)(I).
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are known as an "urban county consortium." The county must also
have authority under state law to undertake or assist in undertaking
low-income housing activities such as the acquisition or rehabilitation
of property for occupancy by low- and moderate-income households,
conversion of non-residential structures for lower income housing use,
and construction of new housing to be occupied primarily by low- and
moderate-income households.3 2 The requirement that counties have
the power to undertake such activities is an important part of the
1974 Act's statutory scheme. The Senate would have provided enti-
tlement grants to all counties with populations in excess of 50,000, but
the House required that "urban counties" have the power to under-
take or assist in undertaking "essential community development and
housing assistance activities." The legislation adopted the House
definition.303
The form of urban county cooperation agreement required by
HUD must meet the following standards in order to be acceptable: 304
(1) the parties must agree to cooperate in undertaking or assisting the
others in undertaking urban renewal and assisted housing activities;
(2) no party may reserve a right of veto over activities that are needed
to meet housing needs the urban county consortium has identified; (3)
the county must reserve the final responsibility for selecting activities;
(4) the county must have full authority to undertake or assist in un-
dertaking community development and assisted housing programs;
and (5) the consortium members must assure their compliance with
Federal Civil Rights Laws.30 5 For the reasons discussed in the follow-
ing subsections, it would appear that counties lack the power to un-
dertake or assist in undertaking most low-income housing activities
and that they may not, therefore, satisfy the requirement that they
302. 42 U.S.C. § 5301(c); 24 C.F.R. § 570.208(a)(3) (1992). These activities, which are
among the "national objectives" of the community development block grant program,
should satisfy the statutory definition of "essential community development and housing
assistance activities." 42 U.S.C. § 5302(a)(6)(A)(ii)(I). HUD's regulations define "essen-
tial activities" as "community renewal and lower income housing activities, specifically
urban renewal and publicly assisted housing." 24 C.F.R. § 570.307(c) (1992). Lower
income households are those with incomes not exceeding 80% of area median income as
determined by HUD. 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(b)(2); 24 C.F.R. § 570.3 (1992).
303. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1279, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4449, 4451.
304. HUD Notice CPD 92-16, at 9-12 (May 28, 1992) (emphasis added) [hereinafter
HUD Notice].
.305. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d- 2000d-7 (1988); Fair
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990); Section 109 of the 1974
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5309 (1988 & Supp II. 1990); Americans With Disabilities Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. 11 1990). The county is required, among other things, to
affirmatively further fair housing within its jurisdiction.
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have "full authority" to engage in assisted housing activities. Never-
theless, nine counties in New York State have qualified as "urban
counties. ' '3 °" The qualification of such counties reflects their powers
to engage in the limited housing activity described below as well as in
a wide range of community development activities. 30 7
2 County Powers to Undertake Housing Activities
It is shown above that counties in New York State can provide
housing for persons with special needs,30 and that they may be able
to participate in homeownership programs benefitting lower income
persons.3° Counties are, however, precluded from most other low-
income housing programs. They cannot act as public housing author-
ities or otherwise receive aid and cooperate with the federal govern-
ment in low-income housing programs because the Public Housing
Law excludes counties from such activities. 310 They lack the power to
fund the development or operation of assisted housing with non-fed-
eral funds because Article 18 of the New York Constitution excludes
counties from exercising such powers. 311 Counties also lack the
power of eminent domain in furtherance of assisted housing pro-
grams.31 2 Counties therefore lack the power to "undertake" most as-
sisted housing activities - meaning, to initiate housing programs of
their own.
3. County Powers to Assist Other Units of Government
Counties are authorized by Article 9, § l(c) of the New York
Constitution
to provide cooperatively, jointly or by contract any facility, service,
activity or undertaking which each participating local government
has the power to provide separately.'1 3
The General Municipal Law similarly provides that counties may
enter into cooperation agreements with other units of local govern-
ment "for the performance of their respective functions, powers or
duties. 31 4 This authority is not intended to augment the powers of
306. See HUD Notice, supra note 304, Attachment A. The nine counties are: Dutch-
ess, Erie, Monroe, Nassau, Onondaga, Orange, Rockland, Suffolk and Westchester.
307. See supra note 298.
308. See supra notes 148-69 and accompanying text.
309. See supra notes 255-59 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 86-89, 285-88 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 66-79 and accompanying text.
312. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
313. N.Y. CONST., art 9, § 1(c) (emphasis added).
314. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW, § 119-O(1) (McKinney 1986).
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local governments, but rather to encourage intergovernmental cooper-
ation in the exercise of pre-existing functions. 315 Each contracting
party must therefore have authority to perform separately the func-
tions that are to be performed cooperatively. Hence, since counties
lack the power to undertake most low-income housing activities, they
also lack the power to engage in such activities under cooperation
agreements with municipalities. 3 6 This conclusion finds further sup-
port in Section 99 of the Public Housing Law,3"7 which authorizes
"municipalities" to render services to public housing authorities and
"to cooperate in the planning, undertaking, construction or operation
of [public housing] projects." Since.the term ''municipality" excludes
counties,318 traditional standards of statutory construction indicate
that counties are precluded from providing such services.31 9
Counties may, however, assist municipalities and public housing
authorities in a number of ways that would provide support for low-
income housing activities. For example, they may use block grant
funds to provide site improvements for assisted housing projects
under their general police powers or bear a portion of planning costs
where that is not precluded by the powers granted to public housing
authorities by the Public Housing Law.320 In addition, counties can
apparently make their property available to nonprofit organizations
for conversion to rental housing for the elderly.321 Moreover, coun-
ties may, under Article 17, participate independently in a number of
315. See 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. 232 (County sheriff could not police town's roads under
an agreement with the town because "no county has the authority through the sheriff to
operate a police department.").
316. See supra notes 80-90 and accompanying text, where it is argued that the New
York Comptroller erred in concluding that county planning boards could perform Sec-
tion 8 administrative services under a contract with a public corporation, because coun-
ties would then "otherwise cooperate" with the United States in the Section 8 Program in
violation of Section 37 of the Public Housing Law. Op. N.Y. Comp. 76-1037 (1976)
(unreported). The administrative functions of a PHA in the Section 8 Program are de-
scribed supra note 81. A county performing such functions would be required to enforce
federal program requirements as well as to cooperate with HUD in its monitoring of the
PHA pursuant to 24 C.F.R. § 882.217 (1992). Such cooperation would seem to be pre-
cisely the kind of activity contemplated by N.Y. Pun. Hous. LAW § 37(l)(i), which pre-
cludes counties from acting.
317. N.Y. Pun. Hous. LAW § 99 (McKinney 1989).
318. Id. § 3(5).
319. See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
320. See supra notes 243-49 and accompanying text.
321. See 1987 Op. Att'y. Gen. 58, discussed supra notes 121-24 and accompanying
text. The use of county property "for residential use other than housing, or for non-
residential use of the elderly citizens of the county" is authorized by N.Y. GEN. MUN.
LAW § 290 (McKinney 1986). By contrast, § 290 allows cities, towns and villages to use
their property as housing for the elderly.
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housing programs for persons with special needs322 and could there-
fore assist other units of government in their own activities. The fore-
going powers, taken together with the power of counties to participate
in community development programs, may be cited as justification for
urban county qualification. However, such qualification may be sub-
ject to question to the extent county activities fail to address the needs
of low- and moderate-income persons as required by the 1974 Act.
The inability of counties to undertake most low-income housing ac-
tivities could prevent the urban county from meeting the housing
needs identified by the urban county consortium. Failure to make
satisfactory progress towards meeting those needs could result in sus-
pension or termination of the consortium's block grant assistance.323
For example, such needs may require that a member of the consor-
tium take land through eminent domain in order to construct low-
income housing. Counties could not perform this function, since the
power of eminent domain in support of low-income housing is given
only to a "municipality" or an "authority, 32 4 both of which terms
exclude counties.325 If, therefore, the city, town or village having ju-
risdiction over the intended site refuses to commence condemnation
proceedings, the housing needs may not be met, and HUD could re-
quire that the offending city, town or village be excluded from the
cooperation agreement.326 This could deprive the consortium of pop-
ulation needed to maintain its urban county status, in which case the
county could not qualify as an urban county in the future.327
C. Special Needs Programs and Homeownership
The authority counties in New York State currently have to oper-
ate facilities for poor persons who are unable to live independently
presents a number of opportunities for greater county participation in
special needs areas. 328 Federal programs for the "frail elderly," the
disabled and the homeless 329 may authorize grants to counties 330 or,
where nonprofit organizations are the only eligible recipients, 331 coun-
322. See supra notes 148-77 and accompanying text.
323. See 24 C.F.R. § 91.75(c) (1992).
324. N.Y. PUB. Hous. LAW § 125 (McKinney 1989).
325. Id. §§ 3(2), (5).
326. 24 C.F.R. §§ 570.307(b)(2), 570.906 (1992).
327. See 24 C.F.R. § 570.307(b)(2) (1992).
328. See supra notes 161-69 and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
330. See supra notes 170-77 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
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ties may make county property available for use in the program. 32 In
addition, counties may participate indirectly in federal programs by
using their existing powers to provide site improvements or planning
services333 that benefit housing projects.
Homeownership programs such as "HOPE"334 and state-federal
partnership efforts like the "HOME" Program33" provide funding for
units of local government that also create additional opportunities for
county activity. However, county participation in these programs
would require state enabling legislation to the extent the programs
involve low-rent housing for lower income persons, since county ac-
tivity would be inconsistent with the Public Housing Law and thus
excluded from county police powers.336
"Affordable" housing programs for middle income families that are
outside the scope of Article 18 33 and homeownership programs that
authorize the sale rather than the rental of housing 338 would not be
precluded by the restrictions on county powers imposed by Article 18.
However, to the extent that state or local funds or property is used to
subsidize the cost of housing, a valid public benefit would have to be
provided in accordance with Article 8 of the New York
Constitution. 39
In summary, counties lack the power Under current law to act as
PHAs in federal housing programs because the New York Public
Housing Law excludes them from the units of government that are
authorized to cooperate with and accept aid from the United
States.34' Counties may, however, be authorized by the legislature to
participate in a number of special needs programs under Article 17 of
the New York Constitution, such as programs for the homeless, the
frail elderly and the disabled.34 In addition, counties may assist
other units of government in their own housing activities by expend-
ing community development block grants under cooperation agree-
ments with municipalities.3 42 Finally, counties may have sufficient
powers to participate in federal programs that fund homeownership
plans or "HOME" partnerships to provide affordable housing if they
332. See 1987 Op. Att'y Gen. 58, discussed supra note 119 and accompanying text.
333. See supra note 320 and accompanying text.
334. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
335. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
336. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
337. See supra notes 251-54 and accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 255-59 and accompanying text.
339. See supra notes 118-31 and accompanying text.
340. See supra notes 285-88 and accompanying text.
341. See supra notes 148-77, 321-22 and accompanying text.
342. See supra notes 293-322 and accompanying text.
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do not involve low-rent housing for lower income persons and provide
a legitimate public benefit.343
VI. Conclusion
Article 18 has never been popular with low-income housing advo-
cates. It was criticized by delegates to the 1938 Constitutional Con-
vention as verbose and too complicated. 3" The Temporary State
Commission studying the 1967 revised constitution suggested it is su-
perfluous.345 Most recently, the New York Attorney General coun-
selled counties to rely upon general police powers to undertake low-
income housing activities.346 For all these lumps, however, the voters
of the state have rejected attempts to replace Article 18 or to increase
its lending authority, and the legislature consistently rejects amend-
ments designed to give housing powers to county governments.347
Constitutional limits on county powers therefore survive and must be
observed carefully at the risk of compromising the legality and viabil-
ity of housing programs.
With the exception of facilities for the aged and infirm,34 it has
been understood until recently that counties had no power to build or
to subsidize low-income housing and that municipal governments,
either directly or through local housing authorities, are best situated
to make policy decisions in the housing field. The availability of fed-
eral funds has inspired efforts to increase the role of county govern-
ments,34 9 but the efficacy of these efforts is open to question, and the
restrictions placed on county activity limit whatever benefits may be
obtained.350
The New York Attorney General's 1992 opinion on the subject 351
represents a sharp change from prior understanding of the law, both
in his office and elsewhere,35 2 but unless county activities go unchal-
lenged, it is difficult to see how the opinion will lead to much low-
income housing development. Its legal analysis of Article 18 is
flawed, and the persuasiveness of the police power analysis loses much
343. See supra notes 334-39 and accompanying text.
344. See REVISED RECORD, supra note 26, vol. II, at 1503 (remarks of Robert Moses
and Paul Windels).
345. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
346. See supra notes 186-204 and accompanying text.
347. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
348. See supra notes 161-77 and accompanying text.
349. See supra notes 80-90 (discussing Comptroller's 1976 opinion) and 186-204 (dis-
cussing Attorney General's 1992 opinion) and accompanying text.
350. See supra notes 80-90 and 240-70 and accompanying text.
351. Discussed supra notes 186-204 and accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
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of its force because of the Attorney General's failure to reconcile Arti-
cle 18 with other provisions of the New York Constitution.353 It may
be expected that bond counsel passing upon the legality of county
bond issues would be reluctant to adopt the Attorney General's ap-
proach and that the ability of counties to finance housing under their
police powers will therefore be severely limited.
Whether counties should have a greater role in low-income housing
activities is another matter. Certainly, county involvement within
small municipalities would be more efficient than establishing numer-
ous small housing authorities. However, town governments could
perform such functions instead of counties, 354 and unless local govern-
ments support the activities counties undertake, the results may be
costly, unproductive and even harmful to poor families who will have
to live with the decisions that are made for them.
In the Yonkers case, 355 the development of public housing was or-
dered in designated locations to remedy civil rights violations, but the
families occupying those units still find themselves living in areas that
may not serve their needs because of the effects of community opposi-
tion and the lack of municipal support for the projects. Public hous-
ing sites that are located long distances from social services, shopping,
employment, religious organizations and the like may well cause oc-
cupants real hardship, which could be alleviated with municipal help
or exacerbated by municipal opposition. The incidence of such hard-
ship would probably increase if county governments had the power to
override local opposition to housing projects and construct them
where they serve county, rather than municipal, interests.
Recent state and federal housing programs that have expanded
homeownership opportunities, 356 and laws that authorize supportive
services for those unable to live independently, 3 7 probably offer the
greatest opportunities for an increased county role. Homeownership
programs may prove difficult to implement, however, to the extent
they serve private interests with no clear public benefit being in-
volved.358 Supportive services programs address only the special
needs of a small percentage of those needing housing assistance and
require the oversight of social services professionals.
In the field of low-rent housing for low-income families who can
353. See supra notes 205-39 and accompanying text.
354. See supra notes 291-92 and accompanying text.
355. See supra notes 6, 8, 16-24 and accompanying text.
356. See supra notes 49-57 and accompanying text.
357. See supra notes 58-61 and 148-77 and accompanying text.
358. See supra notes 109-17 and accompanying text.
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live independently, an amendment to Article 18 of the New York
Constitution would be required before county funds could be utilized;
however, enabling legislation would be sufficient to authorize county
participation in federal low-income housing programs. a5 If such leg-
islation were enacted, it should avoid unnecessary duplication of effort
on the part of other units of local government and require assurances
that county decisions reflect the lawful desires of local governing
bodies.
359. Article 18, § 2 permits counties to cooperate with and accept aid from the United
States government in Federal Housing programs. See supra notes 75-77 and accompany-
ing text.
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